

EL SALVADOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REPROGRAMING

HEARING

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING

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EL SALVADOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REPROGRAMING

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, at 9:05 a.m. in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kasten, Hatfield, D'Amato, Rudman, Specter, Inouye, Johnston, Leahy, DeConcini, and Stennis.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

ACCOMPANIED BY M. PETER McPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMBERS' STATEMENTS

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KASTEN

Senator KASTEN. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, in the debate over U.S. policy toward El Salvador, as is the case too often in debate on controversial questions of policy, we shout our disagreements. These disagreements are translated and conveyed by the media to the American public as screams, screams which would seem to preclude dialogue or compromise. Conversely, when we agree, those agreements are whispered and the whisper of agreement does not interest the media, and so the American public only hears the shouts.

AGREEMENTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD EL SALVADOR

I am going to take a few moments to discuss what I perceive to be those agreements on U.S. policy toward El Salvador which we all hold.

First of all, I think we all agree that the objectives of U.S. policy toward El Salvador are peace and national reconciliation, the growth and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions, and economic, social, and political reform. These objectives are shared by all of us, including the leadership of the government

of El Salvador. In addition, we must take serious cognizance of the consequences of U.S. security were the present government of El Salvador to fall victim to armed insurgency.

Obviously, U.S. policy must be geared to help achieve the objectives just enumerated. Our economic and military assistance seeks on the one hand to promote economic, social, and political stability, and, on the other, to provide the El Salvadoran military with the resources to protect the society at large and to prevent an alien supported insurgent victory.

Second, we are all in favor of a free, fair, open, and safe electoral process in El Salvador. My own perception is that the U.S. Congress and the American people at large are willing to support whatever steps are necessary to secure such an election, including a serious offer to the insurgents to participate in the electoral process.

Third, while this debate is centered on the country of El Salvador, our concern, I believe, lies as well with the entire area, and therefore, we support and, in fact, encourage regional participation in our efforts to secure peaceful solutions.

Mr. Secretary, we are anxious to hear your testimony justifying the administration's latest suggestion with respect to our overall policies toward El Salvador. While there may be disagreement on the subcommittee, I think it is clear that all want to develop a policy which is helpful to the interests of the United States, the El Salvadoran people, and to the region as a whole.

It is my hope that this hearing will help develop a consensus on this subcommittee so that we can come back to you with a relatively unified position supportable not only by us, but by you as well.

I think it is a compliment to this subcommittee that many of the congressional initiatives, and not just criticisms, have come in fact from Members of this Subcommittee. It shows a serious desire to help solve the very real and complicated problems of Central America.

As chairman of this subcommittee, I will endeavor over the next day or so to develop a response to your reprogramming requests, keeping in mind that the issues are complicated, and that answers are, therefore, not easy. I will be consulting all of the members of the subcommittee in order to get their input into our response, and we will have that for you within the time limits that have been set by law.

EXCERPT FROM HOUSE HEARING

Finally, I would like to read an excerpt from a House hearing where Monsignor Freddy Delgado of El Salvador gave testimony which should give us all reason to think about how our actions on this question are perceived in El Salvador.

He said:

In the newspapers, on the television, we hear much about the need for a dialog. The most important dialog that could occur that would help El Salvador would not be a dialog between the government and the guerrillas to divide up power behind the backs of the people. The best dialog that could occur to help my country obtain peace would be a dialog in the United States.

In my country, our greatest priority is national unification and reconciliation. Let me suggest, as an outside observer, that you also need national unification and rec-

conciliation. You in Congress need to hold a dialog with the President, and he must be ready to hold a dialog with you. Nothing would help my country more than if our most important friend and ally would speak with one voice and with one policy of support for our efforts to build democracy.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOUE

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, I would like you to go forward with your statement, but first I would like to ask Senator Inouye if he has any remarks.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I believe that the presence of so many Senators here this morning should indicate to one and all that the issue before us is considered extremely important. I think this is the first time I have seen the Foreign Operations Subcommittee with so many of us present. Usually, as you are well aware, the chairman and possibly one other Senator would be here.

Mr. Secretary, as you are well aware, throughout most of my service on this subcommittee, as the chairman has indicated, I have been a silent supporter of succeeding administrations. But in following the progress of our involvement in El Salvador, I thought the time had come for a little shouting, but hopefully not antagonistic shouting, sir.

I come here this morning, believe me, sir, with an open mind, hoping to learn matters that I am not aware of at this moment. If I can be convinced that the path that I have suggested is wrong, I will be the first to say so. So I will be listening very carefully, and I will also ask a few questions, to which I hope answers will be forthcoming.

Thank you very much.

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Senator KASTEN. Senator Hatfield, as chairman of the full Appropriations Committee has a prepared statement which will be submitted for the record, together with a prepared statement from Senator Jeremiah Denton.

[The statements of Senators Hatfield and Denton follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK O. HATFIELD
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AT A CRITICAL POINT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EL SALVADOR. THE ISSUES THAT WILL BE DISCUSSED TODAY ARE OF GRAVE SIGNIFICANCE TO US ALL AND HAVE RESULTED IN MUCH CONTEMPLATION AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE, INTERESTS WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED AND POTENTIALLY THREATEN OUR SOUTHERN BORDER.

AS I'VE SAID BEFORE, THE TASK BEFORE US IS TREMENDOUS AND FRAUGHT WITH UNCERTAINTIES. WE WILL BE MAKING OUR BEST EFFORT TO RESPOND TO A SITUATION WHERE THERE ARE NO SIMPLE ANSWERS OR ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES. WE MUST NOT ACT TOO ABRUPTLY, TOO THOUGHTLESSLY, OR TOO ARROGANTLY, AS THERE ARE 5 MILLION LIVES IN A WAR TORN NATION THAT LIE IN THE BALANCE AND WHOSE FATE, TO A VERY GREAT DEGREE, IS AFFECTED BY THE ACTIONS WE TAKE.

THERE HAS BEEN A FLURRY OF ACTIVITY IN THE PAST THREE WEEKS ON THIS ISSUE SINCE YOU LAST APPEARED BEFORE THIS SUBCOMMITTEE. PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING THE SITUATION HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD BY A MULTITUDE OF PARTIES, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION. THOSE PROPOSALS HAVE CENTERED ON THE SIZE OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUEST, THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISORS, PROGRESS ON LAND REFORM, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND NEGOTIATIONS OR DIALOGUE WITH ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. THE SUBCOMMITTEE LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU, MR. SECRETARY, ON THESE MATTERS AND ANTICIPATES THE PROSPECT OF BEING ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. YOUR COMMENTS ON THESE ISSUES ARE MOST WELCOMED AND WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEREMIAH DENTON
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALABAMA

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA ARE DIRECTLY THREATENED. THE SITUATION CRIES OUT FOR THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE SENATORIAL ATTENTION. IN NO OTHER REGION OF THE WORLD ARE WE SO RAPIDLY APPROACHING A SHARP POINT OF DECISION, A POINT OF NO RETURN IN PURSUING OUR FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF KNOWLEDGE, OR WISDOM, OR WILL, WILL BE GRAVE INDEED. WE MUST MAKE THE PROPER CHOICES, AND THE TIME OF DECISION IS UPON US.

I BELIEVE THIS BODY HAS THE WISDOM, BUT MAY LACK THE KNOWLEDGE AND PERSPECTIVE REQUIRED TO ACT EFFECTIVELY TO EXERCISE OUR NATIONAL WILL AND TO PROTECT OUR VITAL INTERESTS.

THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR IS, IN ONE VITALLY IMPORTANT SENSE, NOT UNIQUE. THE STRATEGY OF THE TERRORISTS IS ESSENTIALLY A REPETITION OF THAT PREVIOUSLY FOLLOWED AND NOW BEING FOLLOWED IN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. THERE ARE VARIATIONS, BUT THE COMMONALITY OF THE THEME IS THE IMPORTANT FEATURE TO ANYONE VERSED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

IT IS PARTICULARLY CONSPICUOUS AND FAMILIAR TO ME IN MY ROLE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM. WE HAVE HAD MANY HEARINGS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE BEEN ALMOST BOYCOTTED IN THE PRESS AND I WOULD HOPE THAT MY COLLEAGUES WOULD AT LEAST HEAR THE AUTHENTIC FINDINGS OF A GOVERNMENT BODY DULY ASSIGNED THE TASK OF DEALING WITH TERRORISM, BECAUSE TERRORISM HAS A LOT TO DO WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EL SALVADOR.

THE DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THIS BODY MUST COME TO RECOGNIZE, AS OUR PRESIDENT DOES, AS OUR SECRETARY OF STATE DOES, THE FAMILIAR COMMUNIST STRATEGY NOW BEING APPLIED IN EL SALVADOR SO THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH IT ACCORDINGLY. THE STRATEGY IS TO SWALLOW A NATION BY INTRODUCING ESCALATING TERRORISM UNTIL THE INEVITABLY INCREASING GOVERNMENT REPRESSION TO FIGHT THE TERRORISM IS FOCUSED ON BY A STANDARD PROPAGANDA METHOD. THIS PROPAGANDA METHOD IS THEIR MOST POWERFUL MODERN WEAPON. THE WEAPON IS THE PORTRAYAL OF THE GOVERNMENT AS INHUMANE WHILE IT TRIES DESPERATELY, AS IN EL SALVADOR, TO CONDUCT LIBERAL REFORMS WHILE FIGHTING AGAINST TERRORISTS.

THE TERRORISTS COLD-BLOODEDLY FOLLOW A GAME PLAN CALLED "THE MINI-MANUAL FOR URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE," WRITTEN BY CARLOS MARIGHELLA IN 1969. IT IS A MANUAL FOR USING TERRORISM WRAPPED IN POPULAR CAUSES, BUT ACTUALLY A MARXIST-CONTROLLED MOVEMENT AIMED AT COMMUNIZING THE COUNTRY.

HERE ARE MARIGHELLA'S OWN WORDS AS TO WHAT THE TERRORISM AND PROPAGANDA ARE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE WITH TERRORISM RAMPANT.

"THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO INTENSIFY REPRESSION. THE POLICE ROUNDUPS, HOUSE SEARCHES, ARRESTS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE, MAKE LIFE IN THE CITY UNBEARABLE. THE GENERAL SENTIMENT IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS UNJUST, INCAPABLE OF SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND RESORTS PURELY AND SIMPLY TO THE PHYSICAL LIQUIDATION OF ITS OPPONENTS. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS TRANSFORMED INTO A MILITARY SITUATION, IN WHICH THE MILITARISTS APPEAR MORE AND MORE RESPONSIBLE FOR ERRORS AND VIOLENCE. WHEN PACIFIERS AND RIGHT-WING OPPORTUNISTS SEE THE MILITARISTS ON THE BRINK OF THE ABYSS, THEY JOIN HANDS AND BEG THE HANGMEN FOR ELECTIONS AND OTHER TRIPE DESIGNED TO FOOL THE MASSES.

I GO ON WITH HIS QUOTE.

"REJECTING THE 'SO-CALLED POLITICAL SOLUTION,' THE URBAN GUERRILLA MUST BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT, RESORTING WITHOUT LETUP TO SABOTAGE, TERRORISM, EXPROPRIATIONS, ASSAULTS, KIDNAPPINGS, AND EXECUTIONS, HEIGHTENING THE DISASTROUS SITUATION IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MUST ACT."

THOSE ARE CARLOS MARIGHELLA'S WORDS IN "THE MINI-MANUAL FOR URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE." THAT HANDBOOK CAN BE FOUND IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN. IT CAN BE FOUND IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. IT CAN BE FOUND IN MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. IT CAN BE FOUND IN LAOS. IT CAN BE FOUND ALL OVER THE WORLD. THEY HAVE USED IT. THEY CONTINUE TO USE IT.

WHILE ALL THAT TERRORISM GOES ON INTERNALLY IN A NATION, THE FULL FORCE OF THE KGB ACTIVE MEASURES MACHINE DISTORTS THE SITUATION FOR WORLDWIDE CONSUMPTION. AND THAT IS WHERE THE PROPAGANDA COMES IN, WHICH GOES ALONG WITH THE TERRORISM. THE AIM OF THE PROPAGANDA, WHICH IS ENJOYING SOME SUCCESS IN THE UNITED STATES VIS-A-VIS THE EL SALVADOR SITUATION, IS TO ISOLATE THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR FROM OUTSIDE AID WHILE COMMUNIST AID CONTINUES TO POUR INTO THE GUERRILLAS.

THERE ARE CHORDS IN THE U.S. MEDIA WHICH THE COMMUNISTS KNOW HOW TO STRIKE. THERE ARE SIMILAR CHORDS IN ACADEME. TOO MANY IN THIS CONGRESS DANCE TO THAT TUNE, AND FIND THEMSELVES REGARDING IT A DIFFICULT TASK, AS THEY DID DURING AND AFTER VIETNAM, TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO PRESIDENTIAL REQUESTS FOR AID TO BELEAGUERED COUNTRIES.

WHILE A PRISONER IN VIETNAM, I WOULD READ A PARAGRAPH AMOUNTING TO A "BIG LIE" IN THE COMMUNIST SOVIET AND VIETNAMESE PRESS. MY CAPTORS, AT THAT TIME THINKING I WOULD NEVER RETURN HOME, WOULD ADMIT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ME THAT THE STATEMENT WAS A LIE, AND I WOULD PREDICT TO THEM THAT MY COUNTRY'S PEOPLE WOULD NEVER BE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO BELIEVE THAT LIE. INCREASINGLY, MY PREDICTIONS BECAME INACCURATE.

FINALLY, THERE WOULD BE LESS THAN A WEEK'S INTERVAL BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PUBLICATION OF A WRITTEN LIE AND ITS REPETITION, OFTEN IN THE SAME OR NEARLY THE SAME WORDS, BY U.S. WRITERS OR NATIONAL PUBLICATIONS. THAT IS, IT WOULD APPEAR IN THE NEWSPAPER IN HANOI, AND WITHIN A WEEK THE SAME WORDS, OR NEARLY THE SAME WORDS, WOULD BE UTTERED BY U.S. JOURNALISTS, TV COMMENTATORS, OR NATIONAL POLITICIANS.

THEY WOULD SHOW THAT TO ME. THEY WOULD SHOVE IT IN MY FACE. THEY WOULD SAY, THERE, THAT IS WHERE WE ARE GOING TO WIN. WE ARE GOING TO WIN IN WASHINGTON AS WE WON IN PARIS BEFORE."

THAT IS HOW WE LOST VIETNAM. UNFORTUNATELY, THAT IS HOW TENS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOMINO THEORY, WHICH HAS BEEN PROVED VALID, WENT DOWN TO THE ENSLAVEMENT OF COMMUNISM. WE LOST IT BY POLITICALLY AND BLINDLY FORFEITING, THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, THAT WHICH HAD BEEN WON BY A JUST APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE. SUCH FORCE NEED NEVER HAVE BEEN REQUIRED IN VIETNAM IN THE DEGREE ULTIMATELY APPLIED HAD WE RECOGNIZED EARLY ON THE TRUTH OF THE ISSUE IN VIETNAM. AND WE NEED NOT HAVE LOST VIETNAM HAD WE RECOGNIZED EARLY ON THE TRUTH OF THE ISSUE.

NO AMERICAN FORCE NEED EVER BE APPLIED IN EL SALVADOR IF WE CAN NOW BUT SEE THE TRUTH OF THE ISSUE THERE AND ACT ACCORDINGLY.

I WOULD LIKE TO PUT EL SALVADOR AND OUR SECURITY PROBLEM IN CONTEXT WITH AN OVERALL WORLD PROBLEM. I CANNOT HELP BUT NOTING THAT NO LESS A JOURNALISTIC FIGURE THAN MEG GREENFIELD, WHO WRITES FOR THE WASHINGTON POST AND ALSO FOR NEWSWEEK, WROTE WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT IT IS BECOMING UNSTYLISH INDEED AN OBJECT OF DERISION, TO PRAISE THE VIRTUES OF THIS NATION OR TO PLACE IT IN CONTEXT AS THREATENED BY THOSE WHO WOULD TAKE US OVER OR DO US IN.

THE FORCES THAT ARE HOSTILE TO FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE ACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE DISCERNIBLE OBJECTIVES, AND THEY ARE MOVING STEADILY TOWARD THEM. THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES SEEK CONTROL OF THE TREASURE CHEST OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL, OF AFRICAN ORE, OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN RESOURCES. THEY SEEK TO SURROUND CHINA. THEY STRIVE TO ISOLATE THE UNITED STATES, ISOLATE HER FROM HER ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE, FROM FRIENDS AND POTENTIAL FRIENDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

WE HAVE SEEN THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THEIR OVERALL STRATEGY. TERRORISM IS THE CONSTANTLY USED WEAPON. IT IS USED WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS HOW THEY GOVERN. BUT IT IS ALSO THE CONSTANTLY USED WEAPON INTERNATIONALLY AND IT IS BACKED, WHEN NECESSARY, BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES.

THROUGH THE ONE OR THE OTHER, THE TERRORISM OR THE ARMED FORCES, OR BOTH WORKING TOGETHER, A GROWING NUMBER OF NATIONS AND PEOPLE HAVE FALLEN UNDER THEIR CONTROL: VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA, AFGHANISTAN, ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA, CUBA, NICARAGUA. TERRORIST MOVEMENTS ARE ACTIVE IN ASIA, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IN SOUTH AMERICA.

IN ALL OF THOSE PLACES YOU WILL FIND THE URBAN GUERRILLA HANDBOOK AND YET THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TEND TO LOOK AT EACH OF THEM AS SOMETHING UNIQUE, SOME DIFFERENT PROBLEM THAT HAS ARISEN INVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OR SOMETHING OF THAT KIND, WHEN IN FACT TERRORISM INSURES THAT THERE WILL BE CHAOS AND REPRESSION BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO SURVIVE.

I AM NOT SAYING THAT EACH OF THOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE GOOD. I AM SAYING THAT IN THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR THERE WERE FREE ELECTIONS AND PEOPLE VOTED AT THE RISK OF THEIR LIVES, AND THEY HAVE A SOVEREIGN NATION WHICH IS TRYING TO IMPROVE ITSELF.

THE TERRORISTS, THOUGH, REPRESENT ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THAT POPULATION OR OF ANY OTHER POPULATION IN WHICH THEY CAUSE THAT KIND OF PROBLEM.

HARRY TRUMAN RECOGNIZED THIS EARLY ON. THE SAME TECHNIQUE WAS APPLIED IN GREECE AND TURKEY. HE DID NOT SWALLOW IT. THE CONGRESS WAS NOT DUMB ENOUGH TO SWALLOW IT THERE. AND WE TOOK ACTION.

THE PROOF OF THE SMALL NUMBER OF TERRORISTS WAS NEVER MORE EVIDENT THAN IN THE ABSENCE OF VIETCONG ACTIVITY DURING THE FINAL SWEEP IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS IN 1975.

IT IS ALL THERE IN THE PAST IF YOU WANT TO STUDY IT. IT IS EVIDENT NOW. THERE IS NO MYSTERY.

BUT APART FROM THE CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM IN 1975 JUST MENTIONED, MUCH CAN BE ACHIEVED BY TERRORISM, A LESSER LEVEL OF WARFARE. WHEN TERRORISM IS RAMPANT, THE INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER ITS POLICIES AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION, MUST TRY TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO END THE TERRORISM. SINCE COMMUNIST NATIONS ARE RULED BY TERROR, THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALLY APPLIED OR SPONSORED TERRORISM IN THEM IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS.

BUT FOR A NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, MORE OR LESS DEMOCRATIC, WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY TO END THE TERROR, SIMPLY TO INSURE SURVIVAL, LEADS EASILY TO REPRESSION, AND REPRESSION OFTEN LEADS TO REVOLUTION. AND, I MUST EMPHASIZE, THE REVOLUTION IS THE GOAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, ITS ALLIES AND ITS AGENTS. OR, MORE APPROPRIATELY, IT IS THE MEANS TO AN END.

IF, AS A RESULT OF TERRORISM, A REVOLUTION PRODUCES A LEFT-WING OR COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, THE NATION IS EASILY AND SHORTLY ABSORBED INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT. IT IS LOST TO THE FREE WORLD AND TO ANY

PROSPECT OF FREEDOM FOR ITS PEOPLE. WE KNOW THAT THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE, THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE, THEIR FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ARE DREADFULLY WORSENER WHEN THEY FALL UNDER THE TOTALITARIAN YOKE.

CAN WE NOT SEE THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA? THE SENATE SAW THOSE WHO CHAMPIONED THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM, THOSE WHO VIOLENTLY CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM. CAN THEY NOT SEE WHAT THEY HAVE WROUGHT?

WE ARE THEIR SUCCESSORS. I HOPE WE WILL SEE WHAT THEY HAVE WROUGHT.

WE KNOW OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. WE KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN CUBA AND IN ANGOLA. THE RECENT VISIT OF THE POPE HAS HIGHLIGHTED WHAT IS GOING ON RIGHT NOW IN NICARAGUA.

I BELIEVE THAT THE POPE IS PEACE LOVING. I AGREE WITH EVERY WORD HE SAID IN CENTRAL AMERICA. SOME OF THOSE WORDS HAVE BEEN DISTORTED, TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. HE CALLED A SPADE A SPADE IN THE NATIONS HE VISITED. HE WOULD CALL A SPADE A SPADE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND HE HAS, AND WE ARE NOT PERFECT. BUT I LOVE PEACE AS HE DOES, AND I THINK I SEE IT PRETTY MUCH THE WAY HE JUST DEPICTED IT THROUGH HIS STATEMENTS AS HE WENT THROUGH THAT TRIP.

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REVOLUTION PRODUCES A RIGHT WING OR CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT, THAT GOVERNMENT IS HELD UP FOR WORLD DENUNCIATION, CASTIGATION BY ITS FRIENDS AS WELL AS BY ITS ENEMIES, AND THE APPLICATION OF FURTHER TERROR WHICH IS PRESENTED AS A STRUGGLE AGAINST AN ANTIDEMOCRATIC FORCE.

CONSIDER THAT ILLUSTRATIVE CASE OF URUGUAY. ONCE THE SHINING EXAMPLE OF POPULAR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA, THE THREAT AND APPLICATION OF TERRORISM PRODUCED THE INEVITABLE REPRESSION. IT BROUGHT ABOUT A SITUATION IN WHICH URUGUAY WAS ROUNDLY CASTIGATED BY THOSE, LIKE THE UNITED STATES, WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN ITS STRONGEST SUPPORTERS. THE FACT THAT URUGUAY IS NOW MAKING GREAT PROGRESS TOWARD THE PRACTICE OF THE SORT OF DEMOCRACY THAT WE, AND THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE VALUE IS A TRIBUTE TO THEIR COMMON SENSE.

THE PATTERN IS THAT SOVIET SUPPORTED -- AND IN MANY CASES, SOVIET DIRECTED -- TERRORISM SEEKS TO DESTROY DEMOCRACY, TO CAUSE REPRESSION, TO PROMOTE REVOLUTION, TO PRODUCE A DICTATORSHIP. SOMETIMES THAT DICTATORSHIP IS OF THE LEFT, AND ANOTHER FREE PEOPLE FALLS UNDER MOSCOW'S SWAY IN ONE QUICK STEP. BUT A RIGHT-WING DICTATORSHIP ALSO PROVIDES THE SOVIET UNION WITH PRICELESS ADVANTAGES, FOR IT IS A READY

TARGET FOR TERRORISM AND REVOLUTION THAT WILL PRODUCE A LEFT-WING REGIME AND INEVITABLE SUBJUGATION. WHILE IT TAKES A LITTLE LONGER, THE RESULT IS THE SAME.

ALL TYPES OF DICTATORSHIP -- LEFT OR RIGHT, CONSERVATIVE OR FASCIST, SOCIALIST OR COMMUNIST -- FEAR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND SINCERELY HELD RELIGIOUS FAITH. WE IN THIS COUNTRY CANNOT EVER BE COMFORTABLE WITH ANY REGIME THAT DENIES THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE.

OUR MEDIA, AND I FEAR MANY OF OUR POLITICAL FIGURES, IGNORE OR OBSCURE THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ESSENTIAL FACT THAT IT IS MUCH EASIER TO INFLUENCE OR REPLACE IF NEED BE, A RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIAN REGIME WITH ONLY LOCAL RESOURCES, THAN IT IS TO REPLACE OR INFLUENCE A LEFT-WING DICTATORSHIP SUPPORTED BY MOSCOW AND ITS SURROGATES, AND AMPLY SUPPLIED WITH WEAPONS, MONEY, AND SUPPORTIVE PROPAGANDA.

SIMILARLY, TOO MANY IN THIS COUNTRY DO NOT REALIZE THAT OTHER NATIONS DO NOT EASILY OR WILLINGLY TAKE THEIR DIRECTION FROM WASHINGTON. THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION CANNOT DIRECT OTHER GOVERNMENTS HOW TO PROCEED, NOT IN EL SALVADOR ANY MORE THAN IN VIETNAM OR ISRAEL, OR FRANCE. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CANNOT LEGISLATE FOR THE PEOPLE OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, NOR IMPOSE ITS PRIORITIES AND STANDARDS UPON THAT COUNTRY.

JOHN F. KENNEDY, BEFORE HE BECAME PRESIDENT ENVISAGED THAT WHEN HE BECAME PRESIDENT, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING AMERICAN PRESSURE TO BEAR TO CAUSE CHANGE IN REGIMES THAT REQUIRED LIBERALIZATION, TO PROMOTE THE MARCH OF CIVILIZATION AND SO ON. WITHIN 90 DAYS, JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS ALMOST IN DESPAIR WITH REALIZATION OF THE LIMITATION ON THE POWER OF AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO INFLUENCE THE LEADERS OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN NATION.

THE SHAH OF IRAN WAS, BY MOST ACCOUNTS, TO SOME DEGREE DANCING TO THE TUNE OF THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF THE GENERAL TREND OF HIS LIBERALIZING, SUCH AS IT WAS. HE MAY HAVE UNDERESTIMATED THE EFFECT OF THAT LIBERALIZATION ON THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN HIS COUNTRY, AND DOWN HE WENT. AND DOWN HE WENT BY THE SAME KIND OF PROPAGANDA REFERRED TO EARLIER, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT IN ANY SENSE A COMMUNIST-DIRECTED OPERATION.

WE MUST ALWAYS BE CONCERNED, IF WE HAVE COMPASSION, IF WE HAVE INTEREST IN WHAT WENDELL WILKIE CALLED ONE WORLD, IF WE LOVE OUR NEIGHBOR AS OURSELVES. WE MUST ALWAYS BE CONCERNED WHEN A FRIENDLY

NATION, OR INDEED ANY NATION THAT IS STRIVING FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE BETTERMENT OF ITS PEOPLE, IS THREATENED BY ACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS THAT USE THE LABEL "FREEDOM FIGHTER" AS PART OF A CENTRALIZED AND CALCULATED EFFORT TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS.

WE HAVE TOO FEW FRIENDS TO BE INDIFFERENT TO THE PROSPECT OF A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT BEING BROUGHT TO ITS KNEES THROUGH THE BLOODY INSTRUMENTS OF THE TERRORISM TRADE. WE MUST BE CONCERNED WHEN ANY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IS SUBJECTED TO TERRORISM, EVEN IF THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOT ALWAYS FRIENDLY TO OR SUPPORTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES. DEMOCRACY IS SUCH A FRAGILE SYSTEM, SO RARE IN THE WORLD, THAT A THREAT TO IT ANYWHERE IS A THREAT TO OUR OWN ESSENTIAL PRACTICES, BELIEFS, AND VALUES. HAVE WE NOT LEARNED AT LEAST THAT FROM THE STREAM OF REFUGEES THAT HAS FLOWED INTO THIS COUNTRY FROM PLACES AROUND THE WORLD WHERE HUMAN FREEDOMS AND VALUES HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, WHERE TERROR HAS COME INTO POWER? THOSE WHO FLED FROM TYRANNY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THOSE WHO NOW FLEE FROM TYRANNY IN AFGHANISTAN AND LATIN AMERICA, PROVIDE THE LATEST REAFFIRMATION OF THAT FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH.

SINCE THE FOUNDING OF OUR NATION, WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA TO BE OUR FRIENDS. THE RELATIONSHIP HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN AN UNEASY ONE, AND THE SMALLER AND POORER NATIONS TO OUR SOUTH HAVE UNDERSTANDABLY BEEN RESENTFUL OF THE POWER AND RICHNESS THAT OUR COUNTRY HAS DEVELOPED, AND OF THE ARROGANCE DISPLAYED, AND INDEED THE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION WE HAVE SOMETIMES USED IN THE PAST. BUT EVEN SO, WE HAVE SHARED AND COOPERATED TO FURTHER THE IDEALS OF FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BETTERMENT.

HOWEVER SPORADIC AND INSUFFICIENT MAY HAVE BEEN OUR COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES AND ATTENTION, THERE HAS BEEN NO QUESTION THAT THE PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE SHARED A COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE THINGS FOR WHICH ALL RESPONSIBLE AND COMPASSIONATE HUMAN BEINGS MUST STRIVE.

NOW, PERHAPS MORE THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OBTAINED THEIR INDEPENDENCE, THEY AND THE IDEALS WE SHARE WITH THEM ARE UNDER FRONTAL ATTACK BY THE FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND OPPRESSION. THEIR WELFARE AND FUTURE IS THREATENED, AND OUR OWN ESSENTIAL SECURITY IS THREATENED.

VIETNAM WAS A COMMITMENT OF PRINCIPLE. VIETNAM WAS A COMMITMENT THAT HAD TO DO WITH THE GENERAL IDEA OF PREVENTING THE EXPANSION OF COMMUNISM WITH THE COMPASSION THAT WE HAD FOR THOSE WHOM COMMUNISM ENVELOPED. IT WAS NOT AS DIRECT A THREAT AS IS COMMUNISM PRESENT IN CENTRAL OR SOUTH AMERICA, AND WHAT THAT COMMUNISM CAN BECOME IN A VERY SHORT TIME.

SOMEONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION RECENTLY SAID THAT IF MILITARY ACTIVITY WERE TO DEVELOP IN LATIN AMERICA AND WE BECAME INVOLVED, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO SUCK AWAY SOME OF THE FORCES COMMITTED TO THE NATO ALLIANCE. IT IS TRUE. IF THAT COMES TO PASS, IT WILL BE A TRAGEDY BECAUSE OF BLINDNESS AND INACTION, A FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE LOWER LEVELS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY AID THAT ARE POSSIBLE AT THIS POINT.

MUCH IS MADE IN THE PRESS OF THE AUTHORITARIAN NATURE OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. SOME OF THEM ARE INDEED AUTHORITARIAN, FREQUENTLY FOR REASONS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL. BUT MANY ARE STRIVING SUCCESSFULLY FOR GREATER DEMOCRACY. VENEZUELA, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS AN ENVIABLE RECORD MAINTAINED IN THE FACE OF CUBAN THREATS AND TERRORISM DURING THE 1960s. COLOMBIA, WHICH WAS ALSO A TARGET OF THE TERRORISTS, HELD SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS LAST YEAR, AN ACHIEVEMENT ALMOST TOTALLY IGNORED BY THE PRESS IN THIS COUNTRY. COSTA RICA HAS BEEN A PARAGON OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS; MEXICO HAS A LONG TRADITION OF POLITICAL COMPETITION AND DEMOCRACY; AND THE SEEDS HAVE BEEN PLANTED AND ARE GROWING IN MANY OTHER PLACES.

EVEN SO, THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO UNDERMINE AND OVERTHROW ALL GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE NOT UNDER ITS CONTROL HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THIS HEMISPHERE. CUBA IS A WHOLLY CONTROLLED SURROGATE OF MOSCOW.

WE HAD TESTIMONY IN MY SUBCOMMITTEE FROM GERARDO PERAZA, A DEFECTOR FROM THE DGI, THE CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION. HE TOLD US THAT ALL OF THE CUBAN OPERATIVES WERE IN THE SERVICE OF THE KGB IN HAVANA. ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES IN AMERICA -- NORTH, SOUTH, AND CENTRAL -- WERE IN RUSSIA'S INTERESTS, WITH THE SINGLE OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THAT IS PRINTED TESTIMONY. I WISH MY COLLEAGUES WOULD READ IT.

NICARAGUA HAS SLIPPED AWAY. EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA TEETER ON THE BRINK. BRAZIL AND CHILE AND ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY HAVE BEEN ON THE BRINK, AND EVEN NOW, DESPITE PROGRESS, THEIR IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IS LESS THAN WE WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO SEE.

WE MUST UNDERSTAND AS WE ASSESS THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, THAT THE PRIMARY TARGETS FOR TERRORISTS ARE GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE DEMOCRATIC OR STRIVING FOR DEMOCRACY. IF WE FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE POISON, WE CANNOT APPLY THE ANTIDOTE. THE FUNDAMENTAL AND INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNOPPOSED APPLICATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM WILL BE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AND THE LOSS OF THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE TO COMMUNIST ENSLAVEMENT.

IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THAT RESULT WOULD BE MORE IMMEDIATELY THREATENING TO OUR COUNTRY THAN IT WAS IN VIETNAM. I BELIEVE WE ALL CAN AGREE THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN VIETNAM WAS A TRAGEDY FOR THE VIETNAMESE AND FOR THE PRINCIPLES THAT WE STRONGLY ESPOUSE. THE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES THAT MIGHT COME FROM CENTRAL AMERICA RUN INTO FIGURES THAT RAISE THE HAIR ON YOUR HEAD.

AS IN VIETNAM, WE SEE IN CENTRAL AMERICA NEEDS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO ARE LEGITIMATELY DISAFFECTED. BUT, AS IN VIETNAM, WE NOW SEE CREATION OF THE MYTH THAT THERE IS, IN EL SALVADOR FOR EXAMPLE, A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT THAT IS FREE OF OUTSIDE AID OR INFLUENCE, THAT COMMITS NO VIOLENCE ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, THAT IS INTERESTED ONLY IN BUILDING SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS, THAT IS SUPPORTED UNIVERSALLY BY ALL THE PEOPLE IN ITS "FREE ZONES" WITH AN ENTHUSIASM THAT ONE CAN ONLY RARELY, IF EVER, FIND IN THE REAL WORLD.

WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE GENERAL TERRORIST STRATEGY IS MANIFEST IN A PIPELINE FROM MOSCOW TO CUBA, TO NICARAGUA AND INTO EL SALVADOR OF MATERIEL, OF CONTROL, OF TRAINING, OF PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION.

IN NICARAGUA, WHEN THE SANDINISTAS CAME IN, THERE WAS A FEELING AMONG THE PEOPLE IN SOME OF THOSE CITIES AND TOWNS THAT THEY WERE BEING LIBERATED AND THERE WOULD BE APPLAUSE FOR THE SANDINISTAS. THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED IN ONE INSTANCE IN EL SALVADOR.

WHEN MR. PERAZA, THE DIRECTOR FROM THE CUBAN DGI, APPEARED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM, HIS TESTIMONY WAS STUNNING. IT WAS HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE HE SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1971. HE TESTIFIED ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE DGI, AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERESTS. THE DGI, HE SAID, IS NOT IN ANY SENSE A PARTNER OF THE SOVIET KGB. IT IS A SUBORDINATE ENTITY, TAKING ITS DIRECTION FROM AGENTS OF THE KREMLIN. ITS TARGET, AND THE TARGET OF

CUBAN POLICY AS A WHOLE, IS ALWAYS THE UNITED STATES. EVEN CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA WITH ITS ORGANIZED ARMED FORCES WAS DESIGNED AS A STEP TO DEFEAT THE UNITED STATES. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE DRUG TRADE TO THIS COUNTRY, AND THAT IT USES THAT TRADE TO RAISE MONEY AND TO UNDERMINE OUR INTERESTS.

THE PIPELINE THROUGH CUBA DELIVERS \$400 MILLION A YEAR IN AID TO NICARAGUA, AND THAT MONEY SUPPORTS THE OPPRESSIVE NICARAGUAN REGIME AND FINANCES THE TERRORISM IN EL SALVADOR. THROUGH THE PIPELINE THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR HAVE RECEIVED CAPTURED AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM VIETNAM, MASSIVE SUPPLIES. AND PEOPLE ON TELEVISION ARE TRYING TO MAKE A BIG POINT THAT THEY ARE NOT USING RUSSIAN WEAPONS, THAT THEY ARE USING AMERICAN WEAPONS, AS IF SOMEBODY HERE HAD PROVIDED THEM. WELL, THEY ARE USING AMERICAN WEAPONS, AND THOSE WEAPONS CAME FROM VIETNAM.

YASSIR ARAFAT HAS ADMITTED THE PRESENCE OF PLO OPERATIVES IN EL SALVADOR. THE SOVIET UNION ORCHESTRATES AND SENDS AID DIRECTLY, AND KEEPS UP A FLOOD OF PROPAGANDA NOTABLE MORE FOR ITS ENTHUSIASM AND QUANTITY THAN FOR ITS ACCURACY AND ORIGINALITY.

THOSE WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE OPERATION OF THE WORLDWIDE SOVIET STRATEGY WILL FIND OTHER INSTANCES OF COMMONALITY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATING POSITION IN VIETNAM WAS BASED ON THE DEMAND THAT THE UNITED STATES FIRST OVERTHROW ITS NON-COMMUNIST ALLY AND ASSIST IN THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO A COMMUNIST REGIME.

THE POSITION IN EL SALVADOR IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL, AND THOSE WHO ADVOCATE VOCIFEROUSLY THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD FORCE THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR TO ENTER INTO "NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE FORCES DEDICATED TO ITS OVERTHROW SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MAY IN EFFECT BE DEMANDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT PRESIDE OVER ITS OWN DEMISE.

THE UNITED STATES NOW SUPPORTS NEGOTIATIONS "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS," A POSITION WITH WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE. AS THE WASHINGTON POST POINTED OUT YESTERDAY, HOWEVER, THE TERRORIST GROUPS REJECT GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ELECTIONS AND DEMAND AN UNDEFINED "UNCONDITIONAL DIALOGUE."

I HEARD THAT OVER AND OVER AGAIN IN VIETNAM. THAT MEANS THAT, WHEN YOU START TALKING WITH THEM, WHAT IS MINE IS MINE, WHAT IS YOURS IS MINE, AND WE START FROM THERE.

THEY SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST FIRST CUT OFF EL SALVADOR'S MILITARY SUPPLIES WHILE THE TERRORIST GROUPS ARE CONTINUING TO GET THEIRS AND CREATING TERRORISM. THEY DEMAND THAT ELECTIONS MUST BE PRECEDED BY A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT INCLUDES OVERHAULING THE ARMED FORCES, INITIATING SOCIOECONOMIC REFORM AND CHANGING EL SALVADOR'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE TERRORISTS ASK THAT CAPITULATION PRECEDE NEGOTIATION, THE SAME DEMAND THAT WAS MADE IN VIETNAM. IT WOULD BE IRONIC, INDEED, IF THE WASHINGTON POST WERE TO RECOGNIZE THE SITUATION AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES FAIL TO DO SO.

YET THE REGIME OF EL SALVADOR IS REPEATEDLY ATTACKED AS IF IT WERE GRINDINGLY OPPRESSIVE OF ALL THAT IS GOOD IN MEN AND IN GOVERNMENTS. IT IS ATTACKED BY THOSE WHO KNOW FULL WELL THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES ARE A BRUTAL COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP FROM THE LEFT OR A TRULY REACTIONARY AND OPPRESSIVE REGIME FROM THE RIGHT. IT IS CRITICIZED FOR HAVING CONDUCTED REMARKABLY OPEN AND FREE ELECTIONS, WHICH APPARENTLY SUFFERED FROM THE DEFECTS OF NOT HAVING PRODUCED THE RESULT THAT THE CRITICS DESIRED AND HAVING BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND MURDER TO PREVENT PEOPLE FROM VOTING.

THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR FACE A DELIBERATELY CREATED, GUERRILLA PRODUCED CHAOS. THEY ARE FACED WITH THE SUMULTANEOUS REQUIREMENTS OF FIGHTING A WAR, REBUILDING THE ECONOMY, REDISTRIBUTING LAND, WRITING A NEW CONSTITUTION, HOLDING ANOTHER FAIR ELECTION, AND PROTECTING AND PROVIDING FOR A GROWING REFUGEE POPULATION. THE LIMITED RESOURCES OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SEVERELY TAXED, YET MANY CRITICIZE THAT GOVERNMENT FOR NOT BEING PERFECT.

WOULD WE IN THE UNITED STATES ACT AT THE URGING OF A FOREIGN NATION TO DISMANTLE THE GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, BREAK UP WEYERHAUSER, AND DISTRIBUTE IT AROUND AND NOT REIMBURSE THOSE WHO HAD IT BEFORE? THAT IS THE KIND OF THING THEY HAVE DONE THROUGH LAND REFORM IN EL SALVADOR AND OTHER NATIONS, AND THEY HAVE DONE IT AT OUR URGING.

THE TERRORISTS THUS HAVE A SIMPLE OBJECTIVE: TO BRING ABOUT CHAOS. THEY ARE NOT DISTRACTED BY THE REQUIREMENT OF A POSITIVE BUILDING PROJECT LIKE THE GOVERNMENT IS. THEY WANT ONLY TO DESTROY, TO UNDO ORDER. THEY ARE WELL SUPPLIED BY THE PIPELINE FROM MOSCOW.

THE PIPELINE PROVIDES \$400 MILLION TO NICARAGUA. THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING FOR \$60 MILLION NOW AND \$50 MILLION LATER FOR EL SALVADOR

FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, AND MOST OF THAT IS FOR TRAINING. OF COURSE WE MUST PROVIDE AID FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PURPOSES AS WELL AS FOR MILITARY ONES. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE WAS DESIGNED TO FILL THOSE NEEDS.

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE AMOUNT IS TOO MUCH. WESTERN EUROPEAN BANKS PROVIDE MORE MONEY TO NICARAGUA THAN THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING FOR EL SALVADOR. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER WE SHOULD BE DOING MORE TO HELP CONTROL THE TERRORIST THREAT AND TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT INTERNAL REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT.

THE DECISION WE MUST MAKE ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST IS NOT ONE THAT WE CAN VIEW IN ISOLATION. IT IS BUT THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF DECISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, AND BUT THE FIRST IN A SERIES THAT REMAIN TO BE MADE, NOT ONLY ABOUT EL SALVADOR BUT ALSO ABOUT OTHER TROUBLE SPOTS IN OUR WORLD. WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT PROVISION OF THE AID WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EL SALVADOR AND MAKE THE DIFFICULTIES GO AWAY. THE ONLY WAY THAT WILL HAPPEN IS IF THE TERRORIST FORCES ARE ISOLATED AND RENDERED INEFFECTUAL. BUT IF WE DO NOT PROVIDE AID, AND IF WE DO NOT CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS TO MAKE DEMOCRACY PREVAIL OVER TERRORISM, WE WILL CONDEMN EL SALVADOR TO THE ABYSS, INDEED WE WILL HAVE HELPED TO PUSH IT OVER.

AND, OF EVEN GREATER PURPORT, WE WILL SOON AGAIN HAVE TO GATHER TO WRESTLE WITH THE SAME KIND OF TERRORIST THREAT AND TO DECIDE HOW WE SHOULD ASSIST THE NEW FLOOD OF REFUGEES THAT WILL HAVE TO COME INTO OUR COUNTRY.

WE WILL READ IN THE RECORD LONG SPEECHES BEWAILING THE SITUATION THAT HAS ARISEN, AND WE WILL BLAME IT ON SOMEBODY ELSE.

WE IN THE CONGRESS ARE CHALLENGED TO FACE UP TO THE REALITY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE THREAT THAT WE FACE. WE DO NOT HAVE THE LUXURY OF PICKING AND CHOOSING FACTS, OR OF MAKING THEM UP AS SUITS OUR INDIVIDUAL VIEWS. WE HAVE THE DUTY TO WORK WITH THE ADMINISTRATION, AND WITH THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO OURSIDE AND OUR VALUES, TO CONDUCT A REASONABLE RESPONSIBLE, AND WORKABLE POLICY THAT WILL STOP THE STRATEGY OF TERRORISM. ONLY IN THAT WAY WILL WE PROTECT OUR SECURITY, OUR VALUES, AND THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FREEDOM AND LIBERTY THAT ALL MEN SHOULD HAVE.

WHAT IS IT IN THE WEST THAT PREVENTS MANY OF US FROM RECOGNIZING THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THREAT THAT IT PRESENTS TO FREE PEOPLE EVERYWHERE? MEG GREENFIELD OF THE WASHINGTON POST

NOTED MORE THAN A YEAR AGO THAT WESTERN WRITERS HAVE A WEAKNESS FOR SEEING UNFRIENDLY FORCES AS ALWAYS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MASSES, ALWAYS MORE ADMIRABLE THAN THE FORCES THAT ARE FRIENDLY TO US AND SHARE OUR VALUES.

IN AN INTERVIEW, ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN SPOKE OF THE FAILURE OF THE WEST TO RECOGNIZE WHAT WAS GOING ON IN CUBA AND VIETNAM AND NICARAGUA, THAT TOTALITARIAN GANGS WERE ACTING TO SEIZE POWER. HE WAS ASKED WHY IT IS SO FASHIONABLE TO PRAISE THE REGIMES IN NICARAGUA AND VIETNAM, THE TERRORISTS IN EL SALVADOR. HE REPLIED:

"THAT IS THE FATAL HISTORICAL MISTAKE OF LIBERALISM, NOT TO SEE THE ENEMY ON THE LEFT, TO CONSIDER THAT THE ENEMY IS ALWAYS ON THE RIGHT, AND THAT THERE IS NO ENEMY ON THE LEFT. IT IS THE SAME MISTAKE WHICH RUINED RUSSIAN LIBERALISM IN 1917. THEY OVERLOOKED THE DANGER OF LENIN. AND THE SAME THING IS BEING REPEATED TODAY -- THE MISTAKE OF RUSSIAN LIBERALISM IS BEING REPEATED ON A WORLDWIDE SCALE EVERYWHERE."

WE SEE THAT SAME MISTAKE TODAY IN THIS COUNTRY, AND EVEN IN THE SENATE. WE CAN ONLY HOPE AND PRAY THAT IT WILL NOT BE FATAL. LET US USE OUR WISDOM TO SEE WHAT WE FACE, AND ACT UPON THAT KNOWLEDGE WITH WILL AND DETERMINATION.

INTRODUCTION OF SENATOR STENNIS

Senator KASTEN. We are pleased to have Senator Stennis, the ranking member of the full Appropriations Committee. Senator Stennis, do you have an opening statement?

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. I am delighted to be here.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, if you would proceed.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your opening comments and particularly your statement on areas on which we all agree. It seems to me that is a very important starting place for us.

Senator Inouye, I also appreciate your comments, and I too note the large attendance, which I attribute to the subject and its seriousness. I would have to say, it has never been my aspiration to draw a crowd. But at any rate, here we are, and I certainly approach this matter in exactly the spirit that you have said. It is a serious question that is before all of us, and we have to talk about it and try to reason our way through it. Whether we agree or disagree, if we can find some areas of common ground I think that is all to the good.

PREPARED STATEMENT

I appreciate this opportunity to testify, Mr. Chairman. Before beginning my testimony, I ask that my prepared statement be included in the record.

Senator KASTEN. It will be inserted in the record at this point. [The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for this opportunity to testify.

On March 10, the President described very clearly the national security stake we have in Central America and the Caribbean. Many factors are involved and the remedies are complex, but the basic issues are relatively simple: Central America is in transition, trying to resolve the tensions of the past by developing democratic institutions and workable reforms. Violent, anti-democratic minorities with close military and ideological ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union are attempting to disrupt this effort and seize power by force of arms. Central America is too close and of too much strategic importance for us to stand idly by while that happens. Our security is at stake, and our most basic principles are being tested.

It is not surprising that our consultations with a wide spectrum of the Congress over the last three weeks have convinced the President and all of us that a bipartisan consensus on goals does as you suggested in fact exist. No one wants to see Communist guerrillas take power in El Salvador. No one wants to see a second or third or fourth Nicaragua in Central America. We are unanimous in wanting the outcome of the crisis in the region to be peaceful and democratic.

So I would like to focus today on the means to achieve these common objectives. I would like to review our regional strategy and explain why we believe the political strategy the President set forth in his March 10 speech can help end the war and produce a democratic outcome in El Salvador. I will then discuss the resources we need to make it work.

OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY

Our strategy proceeds from an analysis that recognizes, in fact emphasizes, that there are legitimate social, economic and political grievances in many parts of the region. For example, many of El Salvador's problems stem directly from failings of past Salvadoran governments—failings that often go back decades, but which must be addressed now.

The second critical factor is the decision by Cuba with Soviet-bloc support to organize and arm guerrilla forces under Marxist-Leninist control. This tactic—and its fruits—are evident in Nicaragua, which since 1979 has become a base for the export of violence to its neighbors. Almost immediately after the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, El Salvador became a target, with the expectation that Communist bloc training and supplies would bring a quick military victory to Cuban-backed extremists.

Our conclusion is that we face two related challenges: to help alleviate longstanding political, economic, and social problems, and to help counter a Communist strategy which seeks to aggravate and exploit these problems and so to seize power by force of arms.

The strategy we have developed is comprehensive and regional. Much of it has been elaborated in consultation with the region's democracies. It consists of six mutually reinforcing elements. Each is necessary to ensure the success of the whole.

The first and critical component is support for democracy, reform and the protection of human rights. Violence feeds on the failure of local institutions to provide responsive government, justice under law, or means to achieve peaceful social and economic change. We know that democratic governments are far less likely to abuse their citizens than dictatorial regimes whether of the right or left. And we know that democracy cannot flourish in the presence of extreme inequalities in access to land, opportunity, or justice. We cannot hope to succeed unless we address these first-order concerns.

The second element is support for economic development. Underdevelopment, recession, and in the case of El Salvador, the guerrillas' "prolonged war" against jobs, transport, and crops create human hardship and misery that are being exploited by the enemies of democracy. Three-quarters of the resources in support of our Central American policy go to economic assistance.

The third element is support for the security of the nations of the region. We must provide El Salvador and our other friends struggling for democracy enough military training and assistance to protect against the military power of the guerrillas so that non-military solutions can be found. Security assistance is not an end in itself, but a shield for the region's democratization and development.

The fourth element is to give the area hope in the future. That is why our economic efforts go beyond the traditional forms of assistance: the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative proposes unique long-term incentives to spur the sustained economic growth these countries have demonstrated in the past they are capable of achieving.

The fifth element is to deter the Sandinista attempt to promote a "revolution without frontiers," their phrase. We are providing essential economic and security support to Costa Rica and Honduras. And together with other democratic countries of the region, we are working to persuade the Sandinistas that they should come to the bargaining table ready to come to terms with their own society and their neighbors.

The sixth element is support for peaceful solutions. Internal reconciliation—through democratic elections, guarantees of personal security, and amnesty—can be an alternative to violence and the consequences of violence for all concerned. Similarly, regional agreements can strengthen democracy and reduce sources of conflict and militarization.

All six of these elements must be applied and sustained for the strategy to succeed. No amount of reform alone can bring peace so long as the guerrillas expect and seek military victory. No amount of economic assistance alone can suffice if the guerrillas can destroy basic infrastructures again and again with impunity. And even sustained government military superiority alone will not bring sustained peace in the absence of more freedom and of better opportunities for social and economic development.

THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

Let me turn now to El Salvador. How is our strategy working there?

First, respect for human rights has grown slowly, but steadily. Political violence against non-combatants is a serious problem but is down markedly since our assistance began three years ago. Military operations have resulted in the capture of prisoners. The treatment of individuals in prison for security reasons has improved: international access to detained individuals is regular and prison facilities are cleaner and better-administered. Even so, the criminal justice system remains a major concern—one I will examine in greater detail in a moment.

Second, in three short years and despite determined guerrilla opposition, El Salvador's government has redistributed more than 20 percent of all arable land. Some 450,000 people—about one Salvadoran in every ten—have benefitted directly. Strong peasant organizations have emerged. An AID-financed study by independent consultants visiting El Salvador reported that: "Members of the team. . . were under the impression that the conservative coalition that won the March 1982 election has attempted to annul the reforms. During two months of field work, however, we discovered that reforms were still very much alive." The recent extension of land reform legislation confirms this judgment. The distributive aspects of the reform, if continued at the present pace, can be completed this year.

Third, the general economic situation is poor. In the last four years, the Salvadoran economy has contracted by 25 percent. Overall unemployment is in the neighborhood of 40 percent. Imports of medicines and food have been hampered. To maintain even zero growth in real terms, El Salvador needs substantial assistance to import materials, intermediate goods, and essential agricultural inputs for which it lacks foreign exchange.

Part of the problem is that the international recession has depressed commodity and agricultural markets on which El Salvador depends for foreign exchange. But the more serious weak point is that since the failure of their 1981 so-called "final offensive" the guerrillas have moved against the economic infrastructure. They have destroyed 55 of the country's 260 bridges and damaged many more. The national water authority is carrying out 112 reconstruction projects to restore facilities damaged by guerrilla action. Two hundred forty-nine separate attacks have caused millions of dollars of damages to the telephone system. Electrical systems have suffered over 5,000 power interruptions in a 22-month period ending last November—an average of almost 8 a day. The eastern region was blacked out for over a third of the year in both 1981 and 1982. Thirteen crop-dusting planes have been destroyed or

damaged since last October. Over 200 buses were destroyed in 1982 alone. Less than half the rolling stock of the railways remains operational.

In short, guerrilla sabotage is depriving the people of El Salvador of food, water, transportation, light, sanitation and work.

It cannot be stressed enough that this guerrilla campaign of "rule or ruin" is contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of Salvadorans. The Archbishop of El Salvador put it this way on March 18: "The population wants there to be peace. I do not see that the guerrillas, who have progressed militarily and in experience, have popular support. . . . There have been about four or five offensives and who knows how many more to come. But the people want [peace]."

This brings me to a fourth point. The military situation is not desperate, but could become so if we fail to help. The Salvadoran armed forces face the difficult task of fighting mobile and well-trained enemy units supported from the outside, while also protecting static targets and population and production centers. Ten days ago, we had to provide an emergency airlift of critically needed small arms ammunition. The Salvadoran soldier, when well-trained and well-led, is capable: guerrilla operations have for the most part been localized to certain areas of the country, and the government forces we have trained are performing effectively. The three U.S.-trained units conduct themselves professionally both on the battlefield and in their relations with non-combatant populations. But only 10 percent at most of the Salvadoran armed forces have received our training.

Fifth, democracy and reconciliation have made major advances this past year. The Constituent Assembly has engaged a wide and diverse political spectrum from ARENA on the right to Christian Democracy on the left. It has not been easy for often bitter political rivals to deal with each other in a parliamentary forum with the outside world watching skeptically. But gradually they are coming to listen to each other, moderate, compromise, accommodate. In addition to working on a new constitution, the Assembly has reached agreement on a Government of National Unity guided by the multi-party Pact of Apaneca, and proceeded seriously with land reform including the vital and to the Tiller program.

As envisioned in the Pact of Apaneca, the Salvadoran Government has designated three high level commissions: on the political process, on human rights, and on peace. The Peace Commission is specifically charged with developing measures of national reconciliation. Its members include a Catholic Bishop and two civilians, one a representative of the political parties, the other a former Foreign Minister. On March 17, this independent commission formally proposed legislation providing for a general amnesty.

It is this atmosphere—the yearning for peace, the viability of El Salvador's new democratic institutions, and what Archbishop Rivera has called "a desire for understanding more than revenge"—that gives impetus to the decision to hold Presidential elections this year—a decision greeted with hope and approval by all, including his Holiness Pope John Paul II, when it was announced.

In sum, despite continued human rights problems and troubled economic and security conditions particularly outside major population centers heartening progress has been made in political, economic and social reform. Essential groundwork has been laid for progress in national reconciliation.

RESOURCE NEEDS AND OBJECTIVES

Let me now turn to our resource needs and policy objectives.

Economic assistance is vitally needed to permit the purchase of essential imports and to help restore basic services and infrastructure disrupted by the guerrillas. It is needed to strengthen the agrarian reform and to help finance labor-intensive reconstruction that will provide work to those deprived of it by guerrilla sabotage. It is needed to help the private sector, now cut off from capital markets, regain access to credit for critical imports.

To accomplish these objectives, we are planning to provide El Salvador some \$227 million in FY 1983 economic assistance, including economic support funds, development assistance and PL-480 commodity financing. This includes \$67.1 million the President has proposed to reallocate for El Salvador from current funds. This additional assistance—for which no new appropriations are being sought—will be heavily committed to public services, medical needs, and food imports. A major component will support a comprehensive new program of services and reconstruction in two parts of the country most critically affected by the guerrilla war.

To continue building the kind of disciplined, skilled armed forces that can take and hold the initiative while respecting the rights of its people, we submitted to Congress on March 10 a notification of our intent to reprogram \$60 million in FMS

loan guarantees to El Salvador. We are also planning to reallocate to El Salvador \$50 million in grant MAP funds from our January supplemental request. As with economic assistance, none of this increase will involve funds other than those previously requested.

We are not planning to send El Salvador advanced heavy weapons like the Soviet tanks acquired by Nicaragua. Nor have we any intention of Americanizing the fighting by introducing US combat advisors. Rather our emphasis is on greatly expanded training for Salvadoran soldiers, with all or most of the additional training taking place outside El Salvador if funds permit. The funds we have requested would enable us to train some 50 percent of El Salvador's main fighting units, compared to 10 percent until now. They would also help El Salvador's armed forces to increase force mobility with additional helicopters, small naval craft and trucks and to acquire necessary munitions and spare parts. Some of this military assistance will also be used for engineering equipment and medical supplies to provide relief for the people suffering from the effects of the guerrilla war.

Time is important to this objective. The more quickly we help these armed forces become more effective and responsible instruments of El Salvador's national policy, the sooner their shield will be available to protect the emerging democracy and developing economy we all seek. To quote Senator Jackson, "if you're going to have the ballot box free and open, there must be a shield behind which the people can participate."

Let me return here to one problem that is not primarily a question of resources: the deeply troubling ineffectiveness of El Salvador's system of criminal justice. It is true that this stems directly from the larger problem of violence. But it is equally true that efforts to protect human rights and instill respect for the law are gravely hampered if the courts are unable to bring cases to a timely and impartial conclusion.

The Salvadoran Peace Commission and Human Rights Commission together have a mandate to review all laws and procedures governing political crimes, and to make recommendations for improving the judicial system as a whole. Some problems may be subject to relatively prompt action: for example, increasing security for judges and other court officials or transferring jurisdiction over military offenders to military courts. Other problems, such as reviewing rules of evidence and substantive criminal law or upgrading case management, investigative techniques, and judicial administration will by their very nature take longer.

We have been asked for help in this delicate area and want to be of assistance. However, because El Salvador's judicial system is quite different from our own, specific recommendations will require more detailed knowledge and cooperative programs than we have now. We are working on both. And we hope that Latin American democracies, like Costa Rica and Venezuela, whose legal systems are closer to that of El Salvador, will also help.

NEGOTIATIONS

Let me now address the question of negotiations.

The President has emphasized our support for negotiations aimed at "expanding participation in democratic institutions—at getting all parties to participate in free, non-violent elections." We will not support negotiations that short circuit the democratic process and carve up power behind the people's back. We will support negotiations to help provide guarantees of electoral fairness and protection for voters and candidates of all persuasions.

For eighteen months, the government of El Salvador has been attempting to open democratic political processes to all political forces including the Marxist ones. The Peace Commission has the specific mandate to help incorporate all social and political groups in the elections this year. The President of the Constituent Assembly has called for the main political unit of the guerrillas, the Frente Democratico Revolucionario, FDR, to take part in the election.

As the President indicated, we are willing to help. Surely there will be interest in measures which would guarantee the personal security of candidates and their supporters, in the provision of observers to encourage fairness and discourage coercion or intimidation, and in specific ways to ensure access to media, an accurate tally, and—ultimately—respect for the results.

We will be making proposals to the Salvadorans on how we, the Organization of American States and other concerned countries can help to achieve each of these objectives. We are fully committed to this course.

We also support negotiations among countries, as the President has said, "to strengthen democracy, to halt subversion, to stop the flow of arms, to respect bor-

ders, and to remove all the foreign military advisors—the Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, PLO, as well as our own—from the region.” Eight democratic countries of the region, meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica in October 1982 called on Nicaragua to join them in pledging an end to cross-border support of guerrilla violence, a freeze on the growth of military arsenals, and freedom of action for peaceful democratic groups. Nicaragua refused to discuss these principles. The San Jose proposals, if accepted, would reduce East-West tensions in Central America and contribute to a regional political solution.

Discussion now centers on the possibility of a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the five Central American countries, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, observed by the Foreign Ministers of five other countries within the region—Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, the so-called five plus five meeting. This is what the President referred to in saying that a regional peace initiative is emerging. Nicaragua would be engaged in the process. Its good faith, or lack of it, will be tested.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

Pending a peaceful solution, we must also seek to bolster Honduras and Costa Rica, two democracies with troubled economies where major externally-directed terrorist incidents have occurred. These nations—on the borders of Nicaragua—feel most strongly the growing threat of Nicaraguan military power, which is fortified by some 2,000 Cuban and Soviet bloc military advisors.

Both Honduras and Costa Rica have democratic systems. Yet they too are prey to self-proclaimed Marxist “liberators” who despise democracy and attack reform. By strengthening these democracies and by helping them to pass through difficult economic times, we can help both countries to provide stability and hope even in the midst of regional crisis.

We therefore plan to provide an additional \$101 million in economic assistance in fiscal year 1983 for Honduras, Costa Rica and Belize. With the critical \$67.1 million in additional economic assistance for El Salvador, this is a region-wide economic assistance increase of \$168 million, of which \$65 million has been added to our January supplemental request. With respect to military assistance, we are increasing our January supplemental request for MAP funding by \$20 million, mainly for Honduras, with some assistance for Costa Rica and the Panama Canal Area Schools. Thus, as called for by the President, total additional military assistance for Central America, including El Salvador, will be \$130 million in fiscal year 1983.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a final observation. The President eloquently set forth the reasons why the outcome of the current conflict in Central America is important to our national security. I would like to suggest an additional reason. Our Communist adversaries the world over depict the United States as a reactionary, status quo power standing in the way of legitimate aspirations for change. Their propaganda dismisses the relevance of political democracy to the problems of the developing world and asserts that we seek weak, unstable neighbors that we can dominate and exploit.

These assertions are lies. We are, in fact, allied with progressive forces working for economic development, reform, and democracy. We seek not weak, exploitable neighbors, but ones that are strong, secure, and independent. Nor is democracy irrelevant to the problems faced by the developing nations. Democracy, not Communism, is the best way to deal with their problems. That is what the struggle in Central America is all about.

BASIC ISSUES

Secretary SHULTZ. On March 10, the President described very clearly the national security stake we have in Central America and the Caribbean. Many factors are involved and the remedies are complex, but the basic issues are relatively simple. Central America is in transition, trying to resolve the tensions of the past by developing democratic institutions and workable reforms.

Violent, antidemocratic minorities with close military and ideological ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union are attempting to disrupt this effort and seize power by force of arms. Central America is too

close and of too much strategic importance for us to stand idly by while that happens. Our security is at stake, and our most basic principles are being tested.

It is not surprising that our consultations with a wide spectrum of the Congress over the last 3 weeks have convinced the President and all of us that a bipartisan consensus on goals does, as you suggested, in fact exist. No one wants to see Communist guerrillas take power in El Salvador. No one wants to see a second or third or fourth Nicaragua in Central America. We are unanimous in wanting the outcome of the crisis in the region to be peaceful and democratic.

CENTRAL AMERICA STRATEGY

So I would like to focus today on the means to achieve these common objectives. I would like to review our regional strategy and explain why we believe the political strategy the President set forth in his March 10 speech can help end the war and produce a democratic outcome in El Salvador. I will then discuss the resources we need to make it work.

Our strategy proceeds from an analysis that recognizes, in fact emphasizes, that there are legitimate social, economic, and political grievances in many parts of the region. For example, many of El Salvador's problems stem directly from failings of past Salvadoran Governments, failings that often go back decades, but which must be addressed now.

The second critical factor is the decision by Cuba with Soviet-bloc support to organize and arm guerrilla forces under Marxist-Leninist control. This tactic, and its fruits, are evident in Nicaragua, which since 1979 has become a base for the export of violence to its neighbors. Almost immediately after the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, El Salvador became a target, with the expectation that Communist bloc training and supplies would bring a quick military victory to Cuban-backed extremists.

Our conclusion is that we face two related challenges: to help alleviate longstanding political, economic, and social problems, and to help counter a Communist strategy which seeks to aggravate and exploit these problems and so to seize power by force of arms.

The strategy we have developed is comprehensive and regional. Much of it has been elaborated in consultation with the region's democracies. It consists of six mutually reinforcing elements. Each is necessary to insure the success of the whole.

I might just refer, I believe each is necessary and insufficient by itself. So I think we have the old mathematical analogy for a proof that has to be both necessary and sufficient. So we need all of these elements working together to form a workable strategy.

CRITICAL COMPONENTS FOR WORKABLE STRATEGY

The first and critical component is support for democracy, reform and the protection of human rights. Violence feeds on the failure of local institutions to provide responsive government, justice under law, or means to achieve peaceful social and economic change. We know that democratic governments are far less likely to abuse their citizens than dictatorial regimes whether of the

right or left. We know that democracy cannot flourish in the presence of extreme inequalities in access to land, opportunity, or justice. We cannot hope to succeed unless we address these first-order concerns.

The second element is support for economic development. Underdevelopment, recession, and in the case of El Salvador, the guerrillas' "prolonged war" against jobs, transport, and crops creates human hardship and misery that are being exploited by the enemies of democracy. Three-quarters of the resources in support of our Central American policy go to economic assistance.

The third element is support for the security of the nations of the region. We must provide El Salvador and our other friends struggling for democracy enough military training and assistance to protect against the military power of the guerrillas so that non-military solutions can be found. Security assistance is not an end in itself, but a shield for the region's democratization and development.

The fourth element is to give the area hope in the future. That is why our economic efforts go beyond the traditional forms of assistance. The President's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) proposes unique long-term incentives to spur the sustained economic growth these countries have demonstrated in the past they are capable of achieving.

The fifth element is to deter the Sandinista attempt to promote a "revolution without frontiers," their phrase. We are providing essential economic and security support to Costa Rica and Honduras. Together with other democratic countries of the region, we are working to persuade the Sandinistas that they should come to the bargaining table ready to come to terms with their own society and their neighbors.

The sixth element is support for peaceful solutions. Internal reconciliation, through democratic elections, guarantees of personal security, and amnesty, can be an alternative to violence and the consequences of violence for all concerned. Similarly, regional agreements can strengthen democracy and reduce sources of conflict and militarization.

All six of these elements must be applied and sustained for the strategy to succeed. No amount of reform alone can bring peace so long as the guerrillas expect and seek military victory. No amount of economic assistance alone can suffice if the guerrillas can destroy basic infrastructures again and again with impunity. Even sustained government military superiority alone will not bring sustained peace in the absence of more freedom and of better opportunities for social and economic development.

CENTRAL AMERICA STRATEGY—EL SALVADOR

Let me turn now to El Salvador. How is our strategy working there?

First, respect for human rights has grown slowly, but steadily. Political violence against noncombatants is a serious problem but is down markedly since our assistance began 3 years ago. Military operations have resulted in the capture of prisoners. The treatment of individuals in prison for security reasons has improved. Interna-

tional access to detained individuals is regular and prison facilities are cleaner and better administered. Even so, the criminal justice system remains a major concern, one I will examine in greater detail in a moment.

Second, in 3 short years and despite determined guerrilla opposition, El Salvador's Government has redistributed more than 20 percent of all arable land. Some 450,000 people, about 1 Salvadoran in every 10, have benefited directly. Strong peasant organizations have emerged. An AID-financed study by independent consultants visiting El Salvador reported that "members of the team were under the impression that the conservative coalition that won the March 1982 election had attempted to annul the reforms. During 2 months of field work, however, we discovered that reforms were still very much alive." The recent extension of land reform legislation confirms this judgment. The distributive aspects of the reform, if continued at the present pace, can be completed this year.

Third, the general economic situation is poor. In the last 4 years, the Salvadoran economy has contracted by 25 percent. Overall unemployment is in the neighborhood of 40 percent. These are staggering numbers, if you think about them at all.

Imports of medicines and food have been hampered. To maintain even zero growth in real terms, El Salvador needs substantial assistance to import materials, intermediate goods, and essential agricultural inputs for which it lacks foreign exchange.

GUERRILLA MOVE AGAINST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Part of the problem is that the international recession has depressed commodity and agricultural markets on which El Salvador depends for foreign exchange. But the more serious weak point is that since the failure of their 1981 so-called "final offensive" the guerrillas have moved against the economic infrastructure. They have destroyed 55 of the country's 260 bridges and damaged many more. The national water authority is carrying out 112 reconstruction projects to restore facilities damaged by guerrilla action. Two hundred forty-nine separate attacks have caused millions of dollars of damage to the telephone system. Electrical systems have suffered over 5,000 power interruptions in a 22-month period ending last November, an average of almost eight a day. The eastern region was blacked out for over a third of the year in both 1981 and 1982. Thirteen crop-dusting planes have been destroyed or damaged since last October. Over 200 buses were destroyed in 1982 alone. Less than half the rolling stock of the railways remains operational.

So if people say, can the guerrillas do anything, the answer is yes, they have done quite a lot. In short, guerrilla sabotage is depriving the people of El Salvador of food, water, transportation, light, sanitation and work.

It cannot be stressed enough that this guerrilla campaign of "rule or ruin" is contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of Salvadorans. The Archbishop of El Salvador put it this way on March 18. "The population wants there to be peace. I do not see that the guerrillas, who have progressed militarily and in experience, have popular support. There have been about four or five of-

fensives and who knows how many more to come. But the people want peace."

MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

This brings me to a fourth point. The military situation is not desperate, but could become so if we fail to help. The Salvadoran armed forces face the difficult task of fighting mobile and well-trained enemy units supported from the outside, while also protecting static targets and population and production centers. Ten days ago, we had to provide an emergency airlift of critically needed small arms ammunition.

The Salvadoran soldier, when well-trained and well-led, is capable. Guerrilla operations have for the most part been localized to certain areas of the country, and the government forces we have trained are performing effectively. The three U.S.-trained units conduct themselves professionally both on the battlefield and in their relations with noncombatant populations. But I think both those points are worth noting. Only 10 percent at most of the Salvadoran armed forces have received our training.

Fifth, democracy and reconciliation have made major advances this past year. The Constituent Assembly has engaged a wide and diverse political spectrum, from ARENA on the right to Christian Democracy on the left. It has not been easy for often bitter political rivals to deal with each other in a parliamentary forum with the outside world watching skeptically. But, gradually, they are coming to listen to each other, moderate, compromise, accommodate. In addition to working on a new constitution, the assembly has reached agreement on a Government of National Unity guided by the multiparty Pact of Apaneca, and proceeded seriously with land reform including the vital Land to the Tiller program.

As envisioned in the Pact of Apaneca, the Salvadoran Government has designated three high level commissions, on the political process, on human rights, and on peace. The peace commission is specifically charged with developing measures of national reconciliation. Its members include a Catholic bishop and two civilians, one a representative of the political parties, the other a former foreign minister. On March 17, this independent commission formally proposed legislation providing for a general amnesty.

It is this atmosphere, the yearning for peace, the viability of El Salvador's new democratic institutions, and what Archbishop Rivera has called "a desire for understanding more than revenge," that gives impetus to the decision to hold presidential elections this year—a decision greeted with hope and approval by all, including His Holiness Pope John Paul II, when it was announced.

In sum, despite continued human rights problems and troubled economic and security conditions particularly outside major population centers, heartening progress has been made in political, economic, and social reform. Essential groundwork has been laid for progress in national reconciliation.

RESOURCE NEEDS AND POLICY OBJECTIVES

Let me now turn to our resource needs and policy objectives. Economic assistance is vitally needed to permit the purchase of essen-

tial imports and to help restore basic services and infrastructure disrupted by the guerrillas. It is needed to strengthen the agrarian reform and to help finance labor-intensive reconstruction that will provide work to those deprived of it by guerrilla sabotage. It is needed to help the private sector, now cut off from capital markets, regain access to credit for critical imports.

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EL SALVADOR'S SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Let me return here to one problem that is not primarily a question of resources, the deeply troubling ineffectiveness of El Salvador's system of criminal justice. It is true that this stems directly from the larger problem of violence. But it is equally true that efforts to protect human rights and instill respect for the law are

gravely hampered if the courts are unable to bring cases to a timely and impartial conclusion.

The Salvadoran Peace Commission and Human Rights Commission together have a mandate to review all laws and procedures governing political crimes, and to make recommendations for improving the judicial system as a whole. Some problems may be subject to relatively prompt action. For example, increasing security for judges and other court officials or transferring jurisdiction over military offenders to military courts. Other problems, such as reviewing rules of evidence and substantive criminal law or upgrading case management, investigative techniques, and judicial administration will by their very nature take longer.

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pledging an end to cross-border support of guerrilla violence, a freeze on the growth of military arsenals, and freedom of action for peaceful democratic groups. Nicaragua refused to discuss these principles. The San Jose proposals, if accepted, would reduce East-West tensions in Central America and contribute to a regional political solution.

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ECONOMIES OF HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA

Pending a peaceful solution, we must also seek to bolster Honduras and Costa Rica, two democracies with troubled economies where major externally directed terrorist incidents have occurred. These nations, on the borders of Nicaragua, feel most strongly the growing threat of Nicaraguan military power, which is fortified by some 2,000 Cuban and Soviet bloc military advisers.

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CONCLUSION

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a final observation. The President eloquently set forth the reasons why the outcome of the current conflict in Central America is important to our national security. I would like to suggest an additional reason.

Our Communist adversaries the world over depict the United States as a reactionary, status quo power standing in the way of legitimate aspirations for change. Their propaganda dismisses the relevance of political democracy to the problems of the developing world and asserts that we seek weak, unstable neighbors that we can dominate and exploit.

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I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

The subcommittee this morning will operate on a 10-minute rule, and I will ask the subcommittee staff to operate the light system.

ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR

Mr. Secretary, many guerrilla leaders have said that true elections in El Salvador are impossible because of the attitude of the Government in power there. What makes you think that the Government would be willing to hold fair elections, and would, in fact, fair elections be impossible under the present circumstances?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, in the first place, an election was held that I think on the whole had astonishing results, so there is a piece of experience there. Second, they have declared their intention to do so, and, in fact, moved the date a little bit closer than had been originally scheduled.

Beyond that, their constituent assembly has been actively working on the ways in which this election would be held and the various commissions I referred to in my testimony are in various ways directed toward the problems of how to conduct a fair, open, free election. Perhaps the key ingredient, at least in the questions of whether or not this can come about, is whether there can be genuine negotiations with the guerrillas about entering the democratic process and taking part in these elections.

Obviously, no one can know what they will do, but it seems to me it is clear to everyone, and we must do everything we can to help produce the situation where there can be assurance of personal safety, and there can be a presumption of accepting the results, and there can be fair access to media, and so forth, and those are proper inducements for people to join this process and take advantage of amnesty.

Personally, I think as long as they feel they can win a military victory, they are unlikely to take part, but if they feel that that is in question, perhaps they will if what is offered is clear and has a solid basis for it.

Senator KASTEN. Well, let me see if I have this right. You say you would support negotiations on everything to do with the elections, in other words, access to media, security, et cetera. Now, are you saying that the Peace Commission is going to, in fact, contact the opposition parties? What would happen if the opposition parties want to talk now about power sharing, or even power sharing in terms of how the election would be held?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think the idea of having an election, establishing a government, and then having a negotiation to share power in that government with the people who, by armed efforts,

tried to make the election impossible is sort of inherently repulsive, and not a workable way to go about it.

We all know and subscribe to, as you said in your opening statement, the proper way to lend legitimacy to not only a government, but to participation by individuals in it, namely, by having a proper election. So it seems to me that negotiation over the electoral process is quite important and necessary. However, negotiation to develop a shared power government before the election is not appropriate.

THE CLERGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, in testimony before our subcommittee a few weeks ago, we had some discussion of, in your words, so-called Marxist clerics. What is your reaction today to the Pope's visit to Central America in light of your criticism of Marxist clerics?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not think that I phrased my answer to questions on that subject with the greatest felicity. Nevertheless, the meaning that I had was that if members of the clergy take certain actions which, though not necessarily wanting them that way, result in an increase in Soviet power, in the development of a system like that, that is antithetical to basic religious objectives, because the record shows that such regimes are not sympathetic to freedom of worship.

That was the intent that I had, and I do not want to try to quote His Holiness on this subject, but it did seem to me that the reception that he got in Nicaragua was perhaps a marker, and his own comment about the importance of church people preaching about religious doctrine, and foregoing a kind of militant liberal church approach are very much to the point.

BALANCE BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, much of the public discussion on this issue has focused on the military aid and the dollar numbers plus possible restrictions by the Congress. However, you are also requesting a significant number of dollars, \$168 million, for economic assistance overall, including some of the money that has already been appropriated, compared to \$130 million in military assistance.

Are we finding ourselves for political reasons having to balance the military with some economic aid, or is there really a need for as much economic aid as the administration is asking for?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there is certainly a need. I think you can see the need in terms of just the things that need to be reconstructed just by themselves. There is a need in terms of the depressed state of the economy, in part because of the damage to infrastructure, but also because of economic conditions generally.

So, there is a need there, without any doubt. I think a fair question is whether the use of these resources, say, to reconstruct bridges, just to take an example, is going to turn out to be worthwhile in the sense that what has been built can be destroyed, and

here I think we see the interaction between the importance of providing a shield and the importance of providing help to developments in the economy.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN EL SALVADOR

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, a continuing concern of not only the Congress but clearly the American public, and I know it is of particular interest to a number of Members of this subcommittee, is the inability to bring to trial those accused in the murders of U.S. citizens, and the larger problem of the overall judicial system.

You talked briefly about that in your opening statement. It was with this concern in mind that last week I sent a telegram to the El Salvadoran Defense Minister in which I urged him to get the military involved and committed to bringing to trial those accused in the murders of U.S. citizens.

Can you give the subcommittee any additional information on the progress being made in this regard, and specifically what has come out of the meeting of the high command of the Salvadoran military last week? Are we in the process of making real progress in this important area of judicial reform?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I hope we are, and it is desperately needed. I do not have any answer to the critics other than to agree with them, and I say we hope we are. I know the old saying that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, so the proof of whether or not there is progress will be in whether or not things actually take place. It takes more than hope. It takes more than plans. It takes behavior in a court.

So, as I said in my testimony, we are working on it. We have been applying all of the good offices and sense of determination and pressure that we can. I do not think the results to date are remotely satisfactory, but I think there is a very considerable prospect of making genuine headway.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Inouye?

Senator INOUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUEST

Mr. Secretary, I am certain that this subcommittee will be most responsive and favorably inclined to your request for economic—commodity—Public Law 480 or developmental assistance. The matter before this committee is the reprogramming request submitted by the President for \$60 million in military assistance. Therefore, I would like to focus most of my attention on the military aspect of this problem.

In the Congressional presentation, you have indicated that 60 percent of the \$60 million would be used for immediate ammunition and spare parts replacement requirements. It has been reported rather widely in the press and by certain diplomats, however, that Salvadoran forces will not fight at night, and are often reluctant to leave their barracks, and this raises a question of how much ammunition they are actually using.

Second, recently it has been reported very widely that many of the guerrillas' weapons are captured, or even bought, from government troops.

Now, do you have any information as to these two charges?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think each of the points you make are important points, but I do not think they represent the true picture. The Salvadoran armed forces have fought, and will. I think particularly the ones that we train have sustained very high rates of casualties and kept going. They have managed to maintain protection of main population centers, so they have achieved a lot and they have distinguished themselves in quite a number of respects.

No doubt there are instances of the capture by guerrillas of American-supplied arms, but the vast bulk of the arms have been provided through the Soviet Union and Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas. Some of those arms are American arms captured in Vietnam. They have been identified by serial numbers.

So, there have been some American arms that have come by that route.

AVAILABLE ARMS SUPPLY

Senator INOUE. How many days' supply would you say is on hand in El Salvador at this time?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not have an answer to that question. Obviously, it depends upon the rate at which it is being used. It is one of those things that is hard to estimate. I do know that we had to airlift some small arms ammunition a couple of weeks ago to keep their inventory up, so it is a definite problem.

Senator INOUE. If we are not able to determine the rate of expenditure, how can we possibly determine the amount that they need?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, of course, Senator, in part the rate at which they expend has to be related to what they think is available to them, and I know you recall that in fiscal year 1982 I think our level of military aid was roughly \$60 million, and in fiscal year 1983, under the continuing resolution under which we are operating, so to speak, they are operating, that level is about \$25 million.

So, prudence, I suppose, suggests that you pace yourself, recognizing that it may be enough, but you do not want to run out.

GUERRILLA MILITARY SUCCESSES

Senator INOUE. According to history, we have been training and providing subsistence to the Salvadoran armed forces now for over 30 years. In the past 2 years alone we have provided \$117,500,000 in military assistance to this country. Yet, as noted by the March 15 presentation, the guerrillas have gained the military initiative. How has this happened?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not know about the military initiative. I think they have demonstrated a capacity to destroy. They have demonstrated a capacity to disrupt the countryside. They have not successfully disrupted the main population centers at all. They have not demonstrated capacity to take and hold a given area.

So, there is a certain initiative, no doubt, but I do not think that that is quite the word that should be applied to it. It must be said in the light of the history that you cite that the efforts that have been made are short of the mark.

The type of evidence that I think can be cited in support of the possibility of achieving things by further military efforts as well as economic efforts and the general strategy described is the fact that the recent U.S.-trained battalions have performed quite well in both senses that I mentioned in my testimony, and there has been a reasonable amount of progress in the nonmilitary aspects of those objectives.

Senator INOUE. Well, I was quoting from the Department of State program justification, dated March 15, in which you said the guerrillas had gained the military initiative notwithstanding the support we are providing. What reason do you have to believe that we can do better next year than we have in the past 30 years?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have tried to cite some of those reasons. I think there is evidence in terms of the performance of the U.S.-trained battalions. There is determination, renewed determination toward the democratic process. Maybe we are seeing the emergence of a brighter and stronger world economy which will help everybody, including El Salvador.

There are a number of things that can be helpful, but I do not come here saying that I have some sort of magic ability to give you a total assurance. I think it is a big problem. It is our problem. It is their problem. And there are things we can do about it, and I feel we should do them.

MILITARY SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR

Senator INOUE. Do you believe there is a military solution to this problem?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir.

Senator INOUE. Don't you think—

Secretary SHULTZ. I think if I could explain just briefly, I think, as I said in my testimony, you have to approach this with a strategy that has a number of strands, and each strand is necessary. If all you have is a military program you are not going to succeed. You are going to have to have other things going as well. But I think a military component under the circumstances is essential.

NEGOTIATIONS IN EL SALVADOR

Senator INOUE. What are your thoughts on discussions, negotiations or dialog—whatever word is appropriate—that are without condition? I ask this because in all of the presentations I have heard so far it appears that the United States is setting forth certain conditions. We will first have the elections before we negotiate. You must come in to share this election, otherwise we will not talk.

Don't you believe that this is an El Salvadoran problem that should be resolved in El Salvador by Salvadorans?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I do. I think negotiations about the electoral process, obviously, have to take place before the election and not after.

Senator INOUE. Then why does the statement about the elections always come first?

Secretary SHULTZ. I did not make that statement. I said that the Peace Commission has a mandate—the Salvadoran Peace Commis-

sion which we are helping, and which we are supporting. But, as you properly point out, in the end we are not in a position to say do thus and so. It is up to them.

But one of their main tasks is to design that election so that all parties in El Salvador can participate, and in order to do that there is no doubt about the fact that they will have to have a dialog or whatever you want to call it about the ways in which that election will be conducted and the ways in which security will be assured and so on.

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

Senator INOUE. I understand that the administration is planning to provide about \$27 million for a civic action program by the Salvadoran armed forces. Is this a rebirth of the village pacification programs which we carried out unsuccessfully in Vietnam?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is an effort to say to the military forces that as an area is secured it is not enough to use, in your phrase, to think in terms of a military victory. You have to think in terms of a human victory, an economic victory, a psychological victory, a political victory, and that means that you need to give attention to the pattern of life and what it takes to improve it as an armed force is able to get control of an area.

I think that, to my mind, is a very good thing.

Senator INOUE. Why put this program under the auspices of the armed forces? Why not civilians?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the armed forces are there, and they represent an organized body, so I think it is a reasonably natural role for them, but presumably, as time goes on, it is basically a civilian governmental function surely.

Senator INOUE. I have been advised that my time is up.

ADMINISTRATION NEEDS

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Secretary, does the emergency aid request in this particular package combined with the regular 1984 request fulfill the administration's total needs, meeting the political, economic, military, social objectives, or has it been tempered to take into account certain negative political realities?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am not sure what negative political realities you are referring to. There are lots of them around. Could you be more explicit?

Senator HATFIELD. Perhaps we should start by saying list for us the positive political realities that exist in El Salvador. I think the negative political realities are obvious, the problems they are facing with the insurgency such as their problems of infrastructure being destroyed, their problems of trying to negotiate elections and various and sundry other political realities—not knowing how they are going to turn out.

Secretary SHULTZ. Exactly. The request represents our best estimate of the funds needed and usable in a constructive way in the time period involved to implement the strategy that is outlined. I am sure that more money—you could find reasons for more money, but I think that it is important to take the approach that you

should only put in the funds that can be used in a reasonable manner.

Senator HATFIELD. So you think it will be sufficient to meet those objectives that you have set forth in your strategy?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think so.

MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Hinton told the American Chamber of Commerce in San Salvador in October—in fact, October 29, 1982, to be precise—and I quote, “that El Salvador’s army is slowly but surely winning the war.”

At that point the Salvadoran army had suffered over 4,000 casualties and the civilian population had experienced somewhere between 3,500 and 8,000 politically-motivated deaths in a little over 1 year. Now, 5 months later, we get an assessment that we are possibly witnessing the danger of El Salvador losing the war—that is, the established government—unless the U.S. Government provides greatly increased amounts of military aid.

Could you give us briefly the conditions that have created this change of assessment between the time when Ambassador Hinton’s cautiously optimistic statement was made and now, because a while ago you were indicating this aid is going to give us hope of improving the political-economic-social problems down there?

I am just wondering, considering this reversal from 5 months ago until today, how do we expect this to be turned around by this particular package?

Secretary SHULTZ. No doubt there are many causes of the fluctuations of fortunes. My belief is that a major one is a very sharp reduction in the annual rate of military aid coming from the United States, from an annual rate of around \$60 million to an annual rate of around \$25 million. When you do that to an armed force it is bound to have adverse consequences, particularly when the other side gets better organized and built up.

Senator HATFIELD. Considering what was already in the pipeline, do you attribute this reversal from Ambassador Hinton’s assessment to your assessment solely and exclusively on that particular point?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir, I prefaced my comment on that point by saying that no doubt there are various factors that explain the tides in any war or battle. But the flow of resources to the respective sides and their estimate of what is likely must contribute and contribute importantly.

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I believe you indicated before to me and others that you believe the ultimate solution is political.

POLITICAL SOLUTION

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator HATFIELD. When you say “political” I am sure you include economic factors that undergird the political. If you were part of the insurgency, and you saw how much damage you were able to achieve against the established government in destroying the infrastructure, just in cold calculation, what would be the in-

centive to throw down your arms and give up this particular role that you now enjoy as a part of an insurgency?

This economic aid package is only looking at zero growth and maintaining the present status of almost economic collapse. What is the incentive of the insurgency to move to some kind of a change of mind?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you ask it in terms of if I were part of the insurgency. If I were part of the insurgency, which I can't imagine, but nevertheless, if I were——

Senator HATFIELD. This is very hypothetical.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; it is very hypothetical.

Senator LEAHY. You do not have enough hair, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. Gosh, my children keep telling me that, too, but who are you to talk?

Senator LEAHY. I know that. [Laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. I would like to think that I was part of that insurgency for reasons connected with the well-being of the people of El Salvador, and so if I saw that there were a chance for reform in human treatment or genuine assistance to economic growth and stability, to the development of a democratic process that I can participate in, I would like to think that would have a lot of appeal to me, if I felt that the amnesty and safety conditions were real.

Now whether the motivations of the Communist guerrillas are that or not I think is a very open question, and it seems to me more likely their object is to get control for themselves and to run the state in the manner that other Communist societies are run, in which case, if they believe that a military victory for them is possible, they are unlikely to take part.

At the same time, I think the likelihood of willingness to take part will be enhanced if it is shown that there is a determination and an ability militarily as well as in these other dimensions that I mentioned to resist their aggression.

UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Secretary, if the ultimate solution is to be political, and if we have ways to at least engage in conjecture about what the motivations are in the guerrillas or in the insurgency, why not put them to the true test where they have offered to embark and engage in unconditional negotiations? Why are we so reluctant to move in testing their sincerity, testing their willingness to do that, putting them in that kind of situation?

It seems like we would get the offensive in that propaganda warfare, if it is only propaganda.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we think that we have the moral offensive in calling for elections, an electoral process, calling for them to take part in that, and willing to engage in a dialog to set up the conditions under which that could take place in a fair and open and safe manner.

I think in a sense the condition of being willing to negotiate about power-sharing is the obverse of that. So our conditionality is only to say that we do not intend to spend a lot of time negotiating over people shooting their way into the government because we are not going to go along with that.

Senator HATFIELD. I agree with you about shooting their way into the government, but, on the other hand, I do not consider that the only issue to be discussed in negotiations is necessarily power-sharing at this particular point. Elections are a part of this whole program, and it seems to me to restrict it to the kind of a role that we are discussing now for the Peace Commission is narrowing the focus so much that we are leaving them the offensive again.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not know. What would you suggest would be among the things discussed other than that covered? What do you have in mind?

Senator HATFIELD. I think there are probably many issues, and it is difficult for me to think in terms of being a member of the insurgency, like you, but if I were part of that I would think there would be all kinds of economic issues, all kinds of social issues, all kinds of matters affecting the future political direction of the country. I think there would be a lot of issues, not necessarily how many seats we would have in the constituent assembly or something of that kind.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think it is for the election to determine how many seats somebody has and for the electoral process to elicit from people what they believe the future road of the country should be and to go to the people and advocate their point of view, whatever it is.

So I would expect a wide variety of economic issues would be discussed and no doubt available information should be available to the people. So part of a discussion of a proper election would not be simply on the purely technical aspects of the election.

Senator HATFIELD. Of course, no one is predetermined to accept any conclusion on negotiations results. We do not go into negotiations saying we have to accept some kind of results. We can refuse unreasonable negotiations, if that turns into that.

It seems to me we ought to test their sincerity and get them on the defensive in this general feeling that I think the public has that we have restricted negotiations to only election procedures.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think that is the main point of the negotiations and I do not see that we are in a position to negotiate about what action a government will take after it has been elected. That is for the people who get elected to figure out.

Senator HATFIELD. My time is up.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR PROGRAM

Mr. Secretary, I just want to make one closing remark. I hope the administration is looking carefully at what kind of public support they have for this program. According to my mail it is diminishing very rapidly, and I do not think we can expect to come back year after year after year with more requests to continue a policy that seems not to be succeeding at this point, at least as we evaluate the period between 1982 and Mr. Hinton's evaluation and where we are today.

It seems like we are on a downward incline rather than upward.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, if I could just comment on that, I think that there are measures of improvement that can be identified so that I do not think it is correct to describe the situation as one that

has been in a general state of deterioration. Quite to the contrary, I think there are a number of things—and I refer to some of them in my testimony—that are on the plus side.

The big thing we have to do is really get a strong shield up there for these plus things to take hold.

Senator HATFIELD. Hopefully money will buy that.

Secretary SHULTZ. Money will help. Money never is the solution by itself. It takes people, and it takes determination, and it takes spirit, drive, encouragement, and sustainability. All of these things are very human qualities.

Senator HATFIELD. Senator Johnston?

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Secretary, I am very concerned about what it takes in the certification process to satisfy the United States as to progress in El Salvador on human rights. In December 1980 four American nuns disappeared and were later found bound hand and foot, murdered, in a grave. Two labor leaders, Americans, have disappeared in the meantime, and no apparent progress has been made on any of those cases or on others involving U.S. citizens.

In October of last year Ambassador Hinton reported in a speech in El Salvador that 30,000 civilians have been killed since 1979, all noncombatants, and only 200 convictions had been obtained. Recently, as a matter of fact in March 1983, the bar of the City of New York issued a report on the criminal justice system in El Salvador. In this report they pointed out that the justice system is marked by corruption, intimidation, and inadequate training. In short, if you are rich in El Salvador you will never need to go to jail, but if you are anybody else, it is very difficult to obtain justice.

In 1982, this same report from the bar of the city of New York, commenting on the number of murders in 1982, reports that there are four sources for determining those murders—the Socorro Juridico reported 5,967; the Tutela Legal, 5,399; the Human Rights Commission 5,553—all of those based upon reports as to time and place of disappearance and other apparently objective, well-documented facts. Our Embassy admits only to 2,600, that based apparently on generally pro-government press reports. Even if it is the lesser number, it is still a huge number.

Now, with this kind of picture, with this kind of pattern, with this kind of report from the bar of the city of New York, it appears to me that little real progress is being made in human rights—fewer murdered, perhaps, down from 5,000 a year maybe to 3,000 or whatever the figure is, but still a huge number of murders.

As a lawyer concerned about due process, I do not want to tell the Salvadorans how to go about their business, but after a while, after over 2 years have passed in the cases of nuns and after months and months have passed on those of our labor leaders—the El Salvadorans are apparently thumbing their noses at us, and we know what kind of system they have. It seems like too much is too much and our patience ought to be exhausted.

Now my question is. Why shouldn't we now put more specific linkage between our aid and specific progress on human rights,

specifically the nuns' cases, the labor leaders, and other issues involved in El Salvador?

Secretary SHULTZ. We should. I think this is—the things that you cite are—there is no way to stand up and say there is anything remotely acceptable about them. So it seems to me that we have to keep pushing very hard on all of these things and—

Senator JOHNSTON. I am not talking about pushing. I am saying no aid unless you have a trial within a certain period of time.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I am for pressure on these things. I do not know if I want to get myself totally locked in where I have no room for maneuver, where we have no room for maneuver. But I will join anybody in condemning the lack of attention to the dignity of the individual as represented here, and I know we are very concerned about the nuns' case. We are very concerned about the labor leaders, and properly so.

But I think we have to be concerned about the vast numbers of Salvadorans as well as those, the Americans, who are involved. So I do not disagree with you.

Senator JOHNSTON. The problem is, it looks to me like all maneuver and no real pressure. After a certain period of time there ought to be pressure that says either you do it or you just do not get any more money.

Now specifically it has been recommended that there be—and I am again referring to this report of the bar of the city of New York, a new Ministry of Justice which would be a great step forward, that the Human Rights Commission ought to be given subpoena powers over military files and empowered to make investigations into security force personnel. It seems to me these kind of pressures, to demand as an incident of our aid that they do these things, ought to be done.

Secretary SHULTZ. These kind of procedural reforms are being worked on and proposed. The Peace Commission or the Human Rights Commission has been working on this. So that kind of thing is under way.

But I repeat what I said earlier in response to another question. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and after all the procedural work and everything is out of the way, do people get apprehended and convicted if they are guilty and dealt with. That is the end point.

DETENTION OF AMERICAN VISITORS TO EL SALVADOR

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Secretary, on another subject involving human rights, I wanted to bring to your personal attention a series of events which occurred during the summer of 1982 trip to Central America by two sisters of St. Joseph who were part of a 13-member group visiting the Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras. These two nuns happen to be from my State.

This group, upon entering Honduras, was detained for several hours by the Honduran military and was not allowed to make a phone call while they were held. All group members were very upset inasmuch as they had proper identification and were there with the permission of the local relief services. I wrote to Assistant Secretary Enders about this incident on February 18, 1983, and re-

quested that an investigation into this incident be made by our local embassy.

To date, I have not received a reply. It is true that there was no violence involved in the sense of people being shot or tortured or injured, but I think it is the kind of incident that bears out investigation. I am wondering if you will speak to the proper authorities in your department and get a prompt report.

LETTER FROM THOMAS ENDERS

Secretary SHULTZ. I will speak to the proper authorities and get a prompt report. It is being investigated. I think it is a fair statement that the record in Honduras in these matters is pretty good, and so this is an incident. It is something that needs to be looked into, but it does not represent a pattern in Honduras. They do not have the degree of the problem that they have in El Salvador by any means.

[The letter follows:]

LETTER FROM THOMAS O. ENDERS

APRIL 9, 1983.

Dear Senator JOHNSTON: As I indicated to your Administrative Assistant on April 9, the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa has been actively inquiring into the incidents Sisters Redmond and Connell reported following their trip to Honduras last year. My interim reply to your original inquiry, I understand, was lost—at least temporarily—in the mails.

The passage of time between the occurrence and reporting of the incidents has complicated the process of investigation. Since our contacts with the San Pedro Sula local police have not sufficiently clarified the situation, our Ambassador, John Negroponte, is bringing this matter to the attention of the commanding officer of the Honduran Public Security Forces. Ambassador Negroponte sent us the following message on the situation as of April 9:

Embassy has been pursuing investigation with Honduran authorities orally since apprised of details of this issue by Honduran desk officer Dixon. Our efforts have been directed to San Pedro Sula office of DNI (the local police). Description of where subjects were detained seems to confirm that DNI was the branch of the military referred to in subjects' "Memorandum of Verbal Request to Senator Johnston." Official contacts have been unable so far to confirm fact of detention, much less any details.

Ambassador plans to send to the commanding officer of the Fuerza de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP) Colonel Daniel Bali Castillo on Monday, 4/11/83, a letter which reads as follows:

"I wish to inform you that the Department of State in Washington, D.C. has asked me to investigate the circumstances concerning the detention of sisters Robin Cornell and Gay Redmond. Both are religious persons and are United States citizens. Apparently both sisters were detained by the Departamento Nacional de Investigacion (DNI) in San Pedro Sula during the month of December, 1982.

"We understand that sisters Connell and Redmond were detained on December 20 and held for several hours in the detention center on the roof of the DNI building in San Pedro Sula. We have been told that this occurred despite the fact that they had identification which established their United States citizenship and which indicated their association with local religious persons. They also stated that they were denied the opportunity to make phone calls while detained and were quite frightened by this incident.

"I would appreciate if you could look into the facts of this matter and advise me as quickly as possible."

We have every reason to believe that Honduran officials will conduct a serious investigation, and that they will be forthcoming with the results. Ambassador Negroponte is devoting his personal attention to the case. I would also like to assure

you once again of my own concern and interest. You can expect more information from me in the near future.

Sincerely,

THOMAS O. ENDERS.

NUMBER OF ADVISERS

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Secretary, one final question. It has been suggested by Senator Inouye and others that we put a legislative limit of 55 Americans in El Salvador as part of our military training team. We spoke about this the other day, and you testified to it in your original statement, to the effect that you might not need more than 55 so long as you had the rest of the aid.

If you did not get the rest of the aid, you would need more than 55. I take it, then, if you get the rest of the aid or at least a reasonable amount to train Salvadorans in the United States that you would have no objection to putting a legislative limit of 55 American military advisers in El Salvador.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, sir, we do not plan to have any military advisers working with them. These are trainers.

Senator JOHNSTON. Trainers or whatever you call them.

Secretary SHULTZ. So they are presumed not to be engaged in combat roles in a direct way. The number 55 sort of came out of the air, as I understand it. It was here when I got here, and nobody has been able to tell me exactly where it came from.

Senator JOHNSTON. Most numbers do around here.

Secretary SHULTZ. Anyway, it is a rough order of magnitude and, as I understand it, it has never been exceeded. Our numbers are about there at this moment. Obviously, if you say that training is essential—and the relatively good record of those who have been trained would suggest that it is essential—then you want to do it, and it takes money, and it takes money especially if you do it out of country. It is much more expensive.

If you do it out of the country, then the trainers are not in the country. But if you do not have the money to do it out of the country, then the implication is that you need more people to do it.

Now what kind of multiplier effect can take place as training proceeds, multiplier in the sense of you train future trainers, is a question in my mind. I know that that is what you ought to be trying to achieve, I think, in any training program, and presumably we are trying to achieve that.

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. In other words, I am dancing around your legislative ceiling. I do not particularly like it.

Senator JOHNSTON. I know that.

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Secretary, for the record, Walter Stoessel was the gentleman who in a closed meeting or briefing of this committee indicated that 55 was the number.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; but where did he get it from?

Senator HATFIELD. We never question where the State Department gets anything. [Laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. May I take that as a stipulation, Mr. Chairman?

Senator HATFIELD. That is a comment.

Senator LEAHY. That was the number we ended up with in Vietnam, Mr. Chairman—55.

Senator HATFIELD. The Chair now recognizes the Senator from New York, Mr. D'Amato.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my statement for the record.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations meets today to review the President's request for a significant increase in U.S. assistance to the troubled nation of El Salvador and the region of Central America. Many do not realize the strategic importance of Central America to the United States. For example, 44 percent of our foreign trade passes through this region. In addition, a significant portion of U.S. oil imports travel through the Caribbean.

The increased activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the region present a clear and present danger to the interest of not only the United States but to all people committed to the principles of democratic government. We have only to look at events in Nicaragua to realize the potential impact of guerrilla activities in El Salvador and other nations in the region upon the people of Central America.

Some have proposed that the United States terminate all assistance to El Salvador. Clearly this would not be in the interest of the United States nor would it be in the interest of the people of El Salvador.

Nevertheless, serious questions remain with respect to the proper level of U.S. assistance to the troubled nation of El Salvador and the role of U.S. personnel in that country.

I look forward to hearing Secretary Shultz's assessment of the pending proposal and his response to a number of questions which I have with regard to the President's request.

INVESTIGATION OF MURDERS OF U.S. CITIZENS

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have supported the certification requirements that the government of El Salvador make a good faith effort to investigate the murders of American citizens before U.S. assistance is provided to that nation. Going a little further or following up my colleague from Louisiana, Senator Johnston, I have to indicate to you my deep concern that we are being given lip service and that condemning these acts serves little purpose if this matter continues to go unresolved—I am specifically disturbed over the circumstances surrounding the murders of the four American nuns.

It has become quite clear that, as Archbishop Rivera recently reported, the case of five National Guardsmen accused of killing the women is revived only when economic and military aid is sought by the Salvadoran Government. He said this should not be subject to foreign aid but that the purpose of the trial should be to achieve justice.

What are we going to do? Are we really saying that we are not in a position to say to the Salvadorans we want this matter resolved? We are tired. We are tired of the situation that is put on the front burner only when the American people and the Congress speak out and threaten the loss of aid. If that is the kind of people we are dealing with, what kind of social justice, what kind of long-

term solutions can we expect and should our aid then go to this element?

Secretary SHULTZ. I can tell you what I say to them, and it is that in the end the American people will not continue support unless this human rights record is vastly improved and the judicial system is vastly improved. That is not threatening to cut off aid immediately or to say unless you act on this case we will do so and so—that kind of one-for-one relationship. But I think it is a fact that is what is going to take place no matter what.

I do not mind saying that because I believe that we just must get a better performance. I think there are definite signs and capacities to get a better performance, but, as I have said in response to several questions, I am not going to sit here and try to make excuses for that performance. I do not excuse it.

Senator D'AMATO. Well, Mr. Secretary, what, if anything, do you see coming about? What can we do, and what will be done with respect to this particular case? I do not believe that it is sufficient for us——

Secretary SHULTZ. What case are you speaking of?

Senator D'AMATO. The four nuns.

Secretary SHULTZ. As I understand it——

Senator D'AMATO. As recent as the Archbishop indicate, the Salvadoran authorities focus attention on the investigation only when the issue of U.S. assistance is raised. Thus, it appears as though these officials perceive of this matter only when it is politically expedient to do so.

I can speak on behalf of many of my constituents who are outraged over the delays in bringing this matter to justice. This case troubles them and troubles me very deeply. They have identified very clearly that there was a massive effort at covering up this situation. It was only because of an outcry that the Government undertook an investigation, pressure from this Government, and now there is another judicial glitch.

Now it is not good enough, I do not believe, Mr. Secretary, to say that we cannot become involved in the internal affairs of this nation when we are pouring, and we are asked to pour, hundreds of millions of dollars into that nation. I think we certainly can, and I think it represents to many of us the fine line that is important in saying who are we supporting. What kinds of people are these? Are they going to work with us?

If they want our money and, by the same token, say to us do not tell us how to run our court system, when it involves the loss of life of four American citizens, I think I would like to know what are we going to do with respect to this matter? Do you have any particular plans to bring pressure in connection with this particular case?

Secretary SHULTZ. Not only with respect to this particular case but with respect to cases in general. There is no doubt that there is widespread support in El Salvador for better handling of cases of this kind, and their own cases, which far outnumber those obviously involving U.S. citizens. There are plans under way and efforts being made for a reform of the judicial system to engage in the sort of procedural things Senator Johnston talked about, and I think there is a developing determination to make them work.

Clearly, this is a country that is in the process of rearranging itself. Whether it can do so successfully—which we believe it can—is, of course, yet to be proven. The system of justice is one of the key ingredients that is in question. There are patterns there, and I think a developing willpower there.

CASE INVOLVING MURDERED NUNS

As far as the case of the churchwomen are concerned, the nuns, let me read to you the information that we had so I am a little careful on it because I know it is a case of great concern and importance.

On November 15—that is, last year—the judge ordered the churchwomen's case to trial, and on December 6 he appointed defense counsel for the five accused. Defense counsel then appealed the court order raising the case to a plenary jury trial stage, citing insufficient evidence. The appellate court ruled that the trial judge failed to provide the defense attorneys with formal notification prior to ordering the case to plenary—so you talk about procedures and lawyers.

Complying with the appellate court ruling on January 11, the judge formally notified the defense attorneys of his order raising the case to the trial state. Subsequently, the defense attorneys appealed the order raising the case to the plenary stage. They asked that the charges against the guardsmen be dropped for lack of evidence.

On Friday, March 11, the appellate court in San Vicente revoked a lower court motion raising the case to jury trial. They returned the case to lower court in—I cannot pronounce the word—Zacatecoluca for investigation and clarification of evidence.

In its decision, however, the appellate court confirmed the validity of the evidence presented against their defendants. In other words, the charge of aggravated homicide stands, and the appellate court's decision in no way changes the continued detention of the five ex-national guardsmen.

So, I know there have been reports that somehow the indictments have been thrown out or the people are free and so on. That is not the case. They were not thrown out. The charged have not been freed, and there is a presumption on the strength of the statement of the Attorney General that the trial will take place within 6 weeks to 3 months.

Now, what all of this legal business means exactly, I do not know. That is the kind of thing that lawyers engage in. Goodness knows, they sure engage in it in the United States. It is unbearable. I do not know how many of you are lawyers, but it is a problem you create for us.

Senator D'AMATO. Well, Mr. Secretary, I would suggest that this is a matter which is and should be of great concern to us.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with you.

Senator D'AMATO. Given the length of time—and the fact is this goes back to December 1980—and we are talking about legal parrying and thrusting, and I do not believe that this Congress should continue to feel that the requirements under the certification process that they are making—progress in this area, particularly as it

relates to this case—are being met with these kinds of postponements and judicial maneuvering.

I would suggest in whatever manner that would be appropriate diplomatically that they be told of this, and that they be told that those who have supported aid are looking very carefully, because I, for one, may not be so anxious or so ready to continue where I see good faith efforts have not been forthcoming.

LAND REFORM PROGRAM

One other question, Mr. Secretary, with respect to the land reform package. There has been some question with respect to whether or not the government indeed wants to—I understand the constituent assembly has recently reaffirmed support for the program, but what are the prospects that it will have sufficient funds to pay for these lands, or will that be an impediment and do you see a going forward?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think it is going forward. That decision has been made. The process of redistribution has been quite pronounced. I think that is one of the elements of progress that can be cited and, as I said in my testimony, some 450,000 people have been directly affected, and if the rate of action is sustained, then it will be possible to complete the so-called Land of the Tiller program by the end of this year, so you will have created a different kind of situation where people own the land they till, and that gives them a different attitude, I am sure, toward this subject.

Peter McPherson, the Director of our AID program, has been digging into this explicitly. I would like, if I may, to ask him to make a comment about it.

Mr. MCPHERSON. Yes, Senator, you mentioned compensation. Under the so-called Helms amendment, the U.S. Government is prohibited from providing money to either plan for or to provide compensation for land reform or for land in El Salvador. Compensation is a bit of a problem because it would be in the interest of the program to be able to pay more faster. There is no question about that.

There has been some progress on that point. About 30 percent of the phase 1 program has been paid for in cash and bonds, and at this time there is quite an active market in bonds. That is not to say, Senator, that compensation is complete at this juncture, and it does remain a problem.

NUMBER OF TRAINERS

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. I am wondering if the Secretary would address one question. The President has indicated we are not going to have American combat soldiers that would be sent to El Salvador. How would the pending proposal affect the level of U.S. personnel in El Salvador? You have not really quite addressed that.

Would there be any change in the level of troops in El Salvador as a result of the reprogramming that you are asking for?

Secretary SHULTZ. We do not have any troops there.

Senator D'AMATO. American servicemen.

Secretary SHULTZ. We have trainers there in addition to our embassy personnel, but it is the trainers that have been the focal point of attention, and we feel that if the funds are provided fully, which includes a large component—I think roughly a third of the total of \$60 million is designated for training—then it ought to be possible to do this training out of the country and, therefore, you would not need to increase the number of trainers that are currently planned.

So, there is an interplay between the funding and the number of people needed to perform the function.

Senator D'AMATO. I think that is very important that the American public understand that the level of trainers or American personnel will not increase—that is what you are saying—if indeed these funds are made available because it will provide for training outside of El Salvador. Is that what you are saying?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct.

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Leahy?

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE

Mr. Secretary, before we start I wonder if I might put, Mr. Chairman, for the record—it will save me telling everybody tales about how people in Vermont feel about this—an article in this morning's Post by Mary McGrory entitled "A Vermont Town Plays the Tune," et cetera, et cetera. If that could be included in the record.

Senator KASTEN. The article will be included as part of the record.

[The material referred to follows.]

A Vermont Town Plays the Tune, But Reagan Isn't Listening

The citizens of Weston, Vt., population 650, tried to show their leaders the way by voting a cutoff of military aid to El Salvador at their March 1 town meeting.

Local Republicans were mortified at this new repudiation of President Reagan's foreign policy. Last year Weston voted unanimously for the nuclear freeze.

El Salvador's ambassador, Ernesto Rivas-Gallont, pleaded for and was granted an emergency hearing in a special town meeting last Friday night.

He was heeded most courteously and given a standing ovation, but the vote stood.

It is perhaps too much to hope that Congress will act so bravely in dealing with Reagan's request for \$110 million for military aid, although it knows that there is no popular support for more of the same in El Salvador.

Reagan's rhetoric has grown increasingly apocalyptic and intimidating as the government situation deteriorates.

Our national security is at stake, Reagan said.

Mary McGrory

MORE

The Rev. Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority, is of like mind. He told his flock in Lynchburg that "If we do not fight them in El Salvador, we will have to fight them in El Paso."

If Reagan really believes that we are im-

periled by those ragged forces fighting in the hills, he should be asking 10 times more in money and arms for the tottering regime. He should be mobilizing the 82nd Airborne. He should revive the draft.

Instead, he bids us be thankful that he is not sending American troops.

That, to him, is proof positive that there is no comparison between El Salvador and Vietnam.

While insisting there are no parallels, administration spokesmen continually invite them, by talking about "dominos." Never mind that one of the countries said to be slated for domino-doom, Mexico, is in the forefront of Salvadoran neighbors calling for negotiations.

You would think that if the example of Weston and 12 other Vermont towns whose citizens advised the central government to be done with it in El Salvador could not stiffen Congress, a study of the statistics might.

Thirty thousand non-combatants have been killed in El Salvador since the onset of the civil war, which Reagan sees as a Communist aggression fueled by Moscow and Havana.

Of these murders, none has been solved. Not a single member of the security forces or the "death squads" has ever been convicted.

Most recently, in the case of the four American churchwomen who were killed in December, 1980, an appeals court ruled that there is "insufficient evidence" to bring to trial five Salvadoran national guardsmen who were indicted more than a year ago.

There always is, and as far as can be determined, always will be, "insufficient ev-

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idence" for justice to be done. Salvadoran law is a rickety structure, and, with the examples abounding of the danger of provoking the government, no judge is willing to pass judgment on a member of the security forces.

This has not prevented the Reagan administration from continuing to certify El Salvador's "progress" in human rights. Fewer murders are cited, without regard to the fact that there simply are fewer people to be murdered each year.

But Congress has a problem that small towns in Vermont do not have. It has a fear of being asked, "Who lost El Salvador?" Those who do not believe that the Soviets are coming, who blanch at subsidizing slaughter, are nervous about political reprisal.

Reagan obviously will fight to the last peasant. If Congress balks on aid, he will accuse them of expediting a Marxist takeover—which might be averted if he would agree to negotiations now.

Rep. Michael D. Barnes (D-Md.), chairman of the Hemispheric Affairs subcom-

mittee, told the Council on Foreign Relations Sunday night that if the president wants \$60 million he should come to Congress and ask for it in the regular fashion, instead of the back-door approach—reminiscent of Vietnam—a "reprogramming" from other funds. Barnes' subcommittee must act on the "supplemental" request for the other \$50 million.

One member of the House Appropriations subcommittee that must pass on the reprogramming said he will vote "no" unless he gets definite assurances that a political solution will be sought. Rep. Matthew F. McHugh (D-N.Y.) said, "Without a clear promise of negotiations and some specific steps as to how they could be arranged, I will vote against any military aid."

McHugh pointed out that further military aid simply strengthens the extremists in the military and muzzles moderates in the government who might be able to come to terms with the moderates in the political leadership of the guerrillas.

But most of the common sense about El Salvador seems to lie beyond the Beltway.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Senator LEAHY. As you know, the Ambassador from El Salvador went to Vermont to discuss this issue with the people of Vermont.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up a little bit on what Senator Johnston and Senator D'Amato have been saying. But I concur with you that sometimes lawyers can move slowly. I point out, however, that you have four or five former prosecutors on this panel alone. I cannot imagine one of us who would have ever let an open and shut case like the one developed in the nuns' case sit around for 2 years.

But in your statement as to the important elements in El Salvador, you described the protection of human rights as necessary to insure the success of the overall strategy, and I certainly agree with you on that. When we talk about human rights we are not talking about some kind of an abstract notion of people being nice to one another; we are talking about in this case the regime's ability to get the support of its own people and their trust.

You state, and again I agree, that democracy cannot flourish in the presence of extreme inequalities and absence of access to land, opportunities, and justice. You are optimistic in your statement, saying progress has been steady and democracy and reconciliation have made major advances this year.

I cannot quite share that optimism, Mr. Secretary. I do not think there is any real law and order in El Salvador. I think if we try to give a different implication, we do injustice both to our policy and to this committee, and we are going to have to see the reality as it is.

We talked about the case of the four murdered Catholic nuns, but they are only four out of thousands and thousands of people that have been murdered in El Salvador. Let me talk about some of the recent reports that say to me that officials in that country are afraid, are actually afraid to bring the guilty to justice.

When you were before this committee in February, we had just gotten reports of a massacre of 18 Indian peasants, and this report was confirmed by Mr. Alemán, a member of the Human Rights Commission. Now, it is encouraging, I think, that the Human Rights Commission looked into that massacre, but I see the news article in this case states:

"Mr. Alemán realizes it will be difficult to punish any soldiers responsible for the murder of the 18 peasants. 'Even I am afraid to be investigating this, even though I have the authority of the Ministry of Defense.'"

Military units which have been mentioned as responsible for the murder of 17 men and 1 child were apparently stationed at an army base where 10 American advisers are training soldiers.

The head of a local Indian organization said the members of his cooperative were killed because a local landowner whose request to build a road across their property had been denied and friends of the army probably identified the farmers as subversives.

We saw in the papers the tragic case of a 21-month-old baby, an American citizen, whose parents were killed in front of his eyes, and then the soldiers debating over whether to kill the child, too. Our American consul in San Salvador said he had used his informal contacts, his informal contacts in the national guard, to locate the baby. He did not go formally because, "We did not want to jeopardize the life of this child."

Now, I see local human rights officials afraid to investigate. Our troops are training people who apparently are engaging in massacres. You know, I could go on and on. A friend of mine, a former bishop of the Episcopal Church in Vermont, wrote me about a case of decapitation by a contingent of the armed forces in LePlura, seven peasants killed in a church, and on and on.

I do not see—and I know the difficulty that you have when you are faced with the certification process that the Congress requires. I sure as heck do not see any improvement in civil rights.

Let us talk about one other area, the military situation, so we can see what is going on. Here is a state that is smaller than Vermont. It is even smaller than New Hampshire, for that matter, the country down there.

Senator RUDMAN. Vermont is smaller than New Hampshire.

Senator LEAHY. New Hampshire is 100 square miles smaller than Vermont.


Secretary SHULTZ. Be careful. My wife is from New Hampshire.

MILITARY SITUATION

Senator LEAHY. Both states are bigger than Massachusetts, Mr. Secretary, so let us look at it that way.

But let me take a look at this map.

[The map follows:]



U.S. TRAINING OF MILITARY

Senator LEAHY. Let me bring this over here. This might give you a better idea of what we are talking about. We have been training, we have been training these people down there for 20 years now, the Salvadoran military.

Here is San Salvador and here is where some of the biggest fighting is going on. This one out by the volcano, 30 miles away. Up here, 45 miles, and so on. I mean, these are short, short distances. We have got a 9-to-5 army down there, trained by the United States, heavily supplied by us.

Close to \$1 billion has gone to that country in the last 4 years, not all for military, but certainly to try to prop up this regime. We have been training them for 20 to 30 years, and we cannot even get them to go down the road 30 miles to get rid of a guerrilla base, or 45 miles or any of these other distances.

Is anything really going to improve? We have got a total armed forces of 25,000. How many people are actually fighting out of the 25,000? How many are out in the field?

Secretary SHULTZ. No doubt the performance of this armed force, most armed forces, can be criticized. They are engaged in a program of defending static positions. They are trying to defend the infrastructure which has been targeted by the guerrillas. They have fought to the point where they have sustained casualties that are heavy by standards of warfare.

So they are not cowardly. They can fight, have fought, and will fight. But if you say, is the picture really great and ideal, I would have to say no. But I think the evidence is, as I understand it, that those battalions that have received U.S. training have done significantly better, both in terms of military performance and in terms of the so-called civic action elements of their duties.

SIZE OF TOTAL ARMED FORCES

Senator LEAHY. How big is the total armed forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. 31,000, I am informed.

Senator LEAHY. How many are actually out fighting of the 31,000? How many actually go out in the field?

Secretary SHULTZ. You mean how many are—

Senator LEAHY. How many do the guerrillas really have to fear that they might be up against, might come after them?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, presumably they are all able to fight, but in any army some people are in the rear.

I do not know. Do you know what the field unit component of that is?

Senator LEAHY. One gets the impression that they have probably got the most effective rear guard in this army of any.

But seriously, how many actually go out? My report is around 5,000, Mr. Secretary. Does that square?

Secretary SHULTZ. Pardon?

Senator LEAHY. My report is about 5,000 actually go out. Does that square with yours?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am not informed enough about the actual military operation to feel confident in giving you a number. I know that the battalions that have true mobility are limited to two, that

is, able to really get around with proper means of moving themselves.

Senator LEAHY. Do you think if we give the \$25 million or \$24 million, which is one of the compromise proposals to the full \$60 million, that it is going to really make a significant difference either in the effectiveness of the fighting force or in the human rights situation in El Salvador?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think if you reduce the President's request from \$60 million to \$24 million one of the things you will do is practically eliminate the prospect of out-of-country training. No doubt the funds would have to be concentrated on the things most immediately useful in meeting immediate military needs.

Senator LEAHY. Let me follow up on that. We have heard some rather apocalyptic statements by Secretary Weinberger and Mr. Fred Ikle about how El Salvador is connected to NATO's security. I had to get my maps out to fully understand this, but evidently, according to him, if we do not win in El Salvador, we are going to have to withdraw troops from Europe and even from the Far East.

Are we really in that kind of situation, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir, we are not.

THE PEACE COMMISSION

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

One more question, if I still have time. A great deal has been made of the Peace Commission in El Salvador. It was announced about 1 year ago. How many members have they now on the commission?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think there are three.

Senator LEAHY. It took 1 year to get that three. Will they be able to propose legislative changes?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I think they have proposed legislative changes. As a matter of fact, there is an amnesty proposal on the table now. It is to President Magana. It is not on the table in the legislature.

Senator LEAHY. If one of the political parties does not agree to one of the Peace Commission's recommendations, what happens then?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, they have to consider it in their political process, and I think that they are very much on the spot. I do not think that any party would have veto power.

Senator LEAHY. I see my time has expired. I will wait until the next go-round, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, let me say before we go to the next question that it is now 10:55. I understand that you have a meeting with the members of the House Appropriations Committee. It would be our hope that we could continue and go through 10 minutes each, and we will try to do everything we can to make it possible for you to leave here at 11:45.

I would also like to say that you have been sitting here under the hot lights now since 9 o'clock, almost 2 hours straight. We would be more than happy to suggest a 3-minute break to give you a chance

to stretch your legs if you would like, or we can go on. Whatever you would prefer.

Secretary SHULTZ. I am doing all right. I do not mind the lights as much as, as I learned from Senator Leahy, that I am confronting five prosecuting attorneys. [Laughter.]

Senator KASTEN. Maybe we need more than 5 minutes.

Senator LEAHY. That is really five, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Rudman?

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR

Senator RUDMAN. Mr. Secretary, let me switch the area of questioning, if I may, for a moment. I think any fair person listening to both sides of this argument would have to say that, you know, you come up here, and you fence with these issues of human rights. But I think we could probably make a finding here that human rights are probably pretty miserable right now in El Salvador, probably improving but still probably pretty miserable.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with that.

Senator RUDMAN. You would agree with that, and I am sure you do. I can tell that from your testimony. You have not ever said anything to the contrary.

But what is the alternative for the people of El Salvador today? Let us assume that because of this situation we say that we have really had it there with military assistance, the shield that Senator Jackson spoke of. We are just going to remove that shield, and that is that.

What is the alternative, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we can see the nature of the alternative. I mean, you look at the Soviet system, or look at Poland, or look at Nicaragua, for that matter, Cuba. It is not a very pretty picture for them, and not for us either.

Senator RUDMAN. I mean, the fact is we do not really have much choice except to some extent to continue to put up this shield, because the alternative for the people, in terms of human rights, is probably worse than it is today.

Secretary SHULTZ. That is right. But I think that we have to keep pounding away on the human rights issue.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Senator RUDMAN. I do not disagree with that. But you know, we carry on this human rights debate, and I share the concerns as deeply as anyone on this committee, but I just do not know what the alternatives are, and that is what we are facing, the alternatives.

I want to just direct my question to page 8 of your testimony, which I think has not been discussed at all, and that might be the most important thing you said today. I just want to go to the paragraph on page 8 that says.

"Discussion now centers on the possibility of a meeting of foreign ministers of the five Central American countries, along with the other five regional countries as observers."

To the extent that you can, Mr. Secretary, we would be interested in hearing what the word "discussions" means and at what level

they are taking place, and then what timetable you are establishing generally, without setting deadlines. Essentially, what is going on that the public might like to know?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all, we are not directly involved, so we are not setting timetables or trying to manage it. This is an initiative that has emerged in the area, and we support an effort to bring about peace in the area, thinking about it on a regional basis.

It aspires to include Nicaragua. It remains to be seen whether Nicaragua will come and talk about reasonable things, such as ceasing fomenting guerrilla activity in other countries and shipping arms to other countries. But we hope that they will. They have been invited.

I think it is significant that the Central American countries involved expect to be observed, so to speak, by surrounding countries that have a democratic tradition, and so I think that is all to good and suggests the spirit of this effort.

As to content, I would expect the San Jose principles that I referred to in my testimony to be an important part of the content, but that basically the appeal to everybody is a greater measure of peace than now obtains in the region. What I sought to point out was that the President has supported negotiations for peace, negotiations among countries to bring that about, and also negotiations to insure insofar as possible a true democratic process in selecting government.

Senator RUDMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have read your testimony and your letter to the chairman of the full committee, as well as the statement from the Senator from Hawaii, and it appears to me that what he is talking about and what you are talking about are not really that different.

I think the difference is that many of us would feel more confident about what we are doing here if the role of the administration in arranging these activities to take place by the parties in the area were somehow more active than we perceive it to be.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we have been very active. At the same time, I think there is a sense of a Latin and Central American initiative, and if they can bring that off we are in favor of it. We are seeking to help it in every way that we can, but you cannot manage other people all the time, or you should not be doing it too much of the time. So there is a limit to what the United States can do. But we are very active there on all of these matters that we have been discussing, including giving encouragement to trying to bring about a regional peaceful solution.

FUTURE ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR

Senator RUDMAN. My final question, Mr. Secretary. Just looking at the past history around the world and the models that we have for this activity now going on in El Salvador, is it reasonable to assume that over the long term it is going to be probably a very long time before we will be able to withdraw military and economic support from that government, and as a practical matter, the guerrilla movement in that country will probably not come to the table for a very long time?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, that very well may be. If we are able to provide a reasonable and sustained amount of aid of the types that are being discussed and that works sufficiently, both in the sense of exhibiting a military incapacity of the guerrillas to win and a democratic economic prospect, it is conceivable that people will come into the electoral process, at least many of them. It would be conceivable, then, that there would be an election before the end of the year, and I do not rule out the possibility that we might just get somewhere.

I think that the provision of economic aid is foreshadowed, certainly, by the conditions. You say, is it inevitable that we will go on and on forever with this? I say, no, it is not inevitable. I think there is this other prospect. Our strategy is trying to bring it about, but I do not say it will come about. There are all sorts of reasons why.

Senator Hatfield was asking about conditions under which people come into an electoral process. I do not know quite how as a matter of fact somebody stands for an election and goes around New Hampshire saying, "Look what I did for you, I blew up 55 bridges, I wrecked all the power stations, I caused your electrical shortages and made it impossible for you to have work and jobs, so elect me."

I do not think it is a very good platform, and I do not think they deserve a vote.

DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR

Senator RUDMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that at some point, hopefully in the not too distant future, you are going to have to come again before this committee and answer our questions regarding the democratic structure of the government of El Salvador differently than you have honestly and candidly answered them this morning. But simply saying, the facts now indicate that that structure in that country is now very much worth supporting. Because if you cannot get to that point the question arises whether it is worth supporting at all.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think that there is a democratic structure there, and it seems to me that even we must be a little humble in the light of an 80-percent turnout, despite armed efforts to prevent it. When have we had that kind of a turnout in the United States of eligible voters?

So it is not all bad, and in many respects that was inspiring. I know many of the members of Congress went and observed and came back, and we were very impressed with what took place.

So this land reform program is a big thing. Imagine, 20 percent of the land redistributed. That is a huge undertaking. So it is not as though nothing is going on there.

Senator RUDMAN. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. Senator DeConcini?

SOURCE OF GUERRILLA MATERIAL

Senator DeCONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I find your testimony very candid and open, and certainly your response to Senators Leahy and Rudman and others who have spent some time here on the human rights issue to be

most forward, and I thank you for that. But you know, I want to ask a question, and I think you pretty well intimate that the source of the materiel and advisors for the guerrillas come from Cuba and Nicaragua. Is that what our intelligence tells us, and is that factual in your understanding?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator DeCONCINI. Are you at liberty to discuss with us here today whether or not there are any efforts on behalf of our Government to attempt to slow down or curtail that flow of materiel and advisors that are constantly pouring into the rebels' hands?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, as I understand it, those matters are discussed regularly with various intelligence committees, and I think I will let it go at that.

Senator DeCONCINI. OK. Well, in that case, may I ask you this question? If that is the source of the problem, do we not really have to address that source if we are looking for some kind of a lasting curtailment of this, what appears to me to be an advancing guerrilla success on the ground, at least, and disruption of that present regime and government that is there?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, if we can deny the supply of arms and other materiel, command and control materiel in particular, of course, that is a great advantage to us. And there are various ways, of course, in which that might be done, and one of them is that if you can find out where it is coming to in El Salvador, maybe you can find out something about it.

GLOBAL MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE

Senator DeCONCINI. Well, I would only suggest that if we are looking for a long-range solution here, and I share the frustration the Senator from New Hampshire has, I may very well support the administration's request, because I do not know of any other alternative, but I share the frustrations here that this is going to continue to go on and on as long as that source can act with no curtailment and impunity to supply this type of material as well as the propaganda, and the consultants and personnel that are there.

I think, in this Senator's judgment, that unless we address this big problem in the Caribbean and in Central America, and unless we do it openly, in our process, and unless the administration will indeed make an effort to declassify some of the information that a few of us have had and those on the Intelligence Committee have had greater access to, I do not think we are going to find a solution there, and that we will indeed, whatever the amount of dollars we authorize and appropriate here, they will be sopped up in the sponge of the problems there, and you will be here next year once again asking for more, with the same proposal, just a let us do it again, gentlemen and ladies, and we will find a solution.

I just hope that the administration and your leadership might come to the conclusion that I have come to over the last couple of years, that we have got to address the source of this problem or it is not going to go away, I do not care how much money we pour in there, and I wonder what your reaction to that possibility of the administration addressing the source rather than what I consider more of a bandaid approach.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with the inference made by the direct statement of your comment that the problem is far broader than a Central American problem. It is a problem of our contest with the Soviet system, with Soviet military power, and with the exertion of that power. It is connected with the fact that there are Cuban troops in Angola. It is connected with the fact that the Soviets are in Afghanistan. It is connected with the conditions that we see in Poland. It is connected with what has happened in Vietnam, or what Vietnam has done to what we used to call Cambodia. Now everybody calls it Kampuchea.

It is connected with the fact that there does seem to be very little regard in the Soviet Union for the Helsinki Accords as we talk about human rights problems. It is connected, in other words, with a very broad development of Soviet power that is causing us to spend large amounts of money on our defense, which I support completely. You must do it. All of these things are of a piece. To a degree, I think people around the world watch, and they say, the United States cannot maintain freedom and democracy in its own neighborhood and maintain the willpower to do it. How can it aspire to defend its own interests and help allies defend theirs in a global sense?

I think your point is well taken.

U.S. RESPONSE

Senator DECONCINI. But what are we going to do about it except increase our defense expenditures by 10 percent? We have no policy except another \$60 million of reprogramming for El Salvador. It seems to me we do not have a Caribbean policy other than some additional foreign assistance of going to the source of this problem, and I think we know where it is. You mentioned Cuba, of course. You did not mention Nicaragua, but I presume that is part of the plan, too.

We do not have a policy. Now, maybe it is an assessment by the administration, and you would like to comment that the American people would not tolerate a strong, forceful position by this country to bring about the elimination of that kind of infiltration and direct military advisors' availability to rebel sources, but I would like to know what your opinions are.

Are we prepared to do that? Is it under consideration? Or do you think that we should take a stronger position outside the sphere of only El Salvador and the aid we are discussing this morning?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have the impression that it is difficult enough to get this committee to go along with 55 trainers, let alone one military advisor, let alone a commitment of American troops. So I do not sense any great political mood for us to commit armed U.S. forces there, but I do think it is essential to make this broad connection that your question brought out, and I think it brings out the importance of looking to our defenses. It brings out the importance of being realistic about what is going on in the world. It brings out the importance as we agonize over the human rights record in this country that we are trying to help that we look at the inconceivable bestiality of what has happened in Cambodia, and we consider these things as part of a piece.

Senator DECONCINI. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think the point I want to get across is the fact that the administration may assess that it is hard to get 55 military advisors approved, or trainers. Certainly, it would be difficult to get ground troops or more forceful decisions or a blockade of Cuba or something, but is that not the leadership responsibility, to bring out the facts to the public of just how severe this is, where this aid is coming from, and to declassify some of the information the administration has available so we can indeed have a public discussion of the severity of this cancer that is growing there?

I am not chastising you for it. I am only suggesting that there are going to be more problems with getting 55 trainers there as no real progress seems to come forward. Indeed, the what I consider oversensitiveness by the administration, and it was the past administration the same way, of the dissemination of materiel and advisors and propaganda from the sources there continues, and I see a hopeless case, and though I may continue to support you, sooner or later this Senator is going to fall off the wagon, too, I am afraid, as other staunch supporters, particularly the Senator from Hawaii, who has been one of the most responsible of all Senators in my judgment of assessing this, regardless of political effects, and many other members here, too.

When you see the drift, it is because it seems to me we do not have the leadership to tell the public and to expose this material. I just want to leave that with you as one concerned Senator, that we are not getting to the problem, discussing \$60 million.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I agree with you, and I would say that the President has been using his utmost efforts to draw forcefully to the attention of the American people and to the attention of the Congress the severe military situation that obtains, and Secretary Weinberger has been doing likewise, and all have, and I think there has been basically a very good congressional response, although right now there seems to be a lot of debate about the maintenance of a proper defense effort.

I think we should be bringing the facts out, and doing it as forcefully and frequently and vividly, and of course always trying to and being sure that we stick with the facts, but bring those out to the American people so that everybody sees what is going on. I agree completely.

Senator DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Secretary SHULTZ. I do think that I would differ with you in your comment that we do not have any strategy. We do have a strategy. A strategy with respect to Central America has strands that I tried to bring out in my testimony, and with respect to the Caribbean, there is a definite initiative that the President has taken. The financial side of that was passed by the Congress. The trade and tax incentive sides have not been addressed by the Congress, but I think it very important to carry the strategy through.

Senator DECONCINI. Is that going to get to the source of the problem of the supplies and the material there, the Caribbean proposal? I submit that it would not.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Specter?

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POSSIBLE AREAS OF NEGOTIATION

Mr. Secretary, there are a couple of lines I would like to pursue with you this morning. The subject of negotiations is one which is troublesome, and we discussed this at some length when you were nice enough to invite a few of us for breakfast last week, and I note in your statement, and I may be reading more into it than is present, but at least a slight difference of emphasis when you say on page 7, "We will not support negotiations that short circuit the democratic process and carve up power behind the people's back, but that still leaves a fair range of negotiable subjects besides the electoral process itself."

When you had asked Senator Hatfield what lines he might suggest, I would have some specific suggestions for you. Would it be appropriate to discuss the judicial system, which is a very troublesome aspect? Would it not be appropriate to discuss the economic development, a subject that you touch upon in your statement, a very important one on job opportunities? Or discuss the subject of land reform.

This is not in the context of saying that you are going to accept what the insurgents say, but only that there are subjects which can be discussed beyond the electoral system itself, and that it is conceivable that if somebody has a chance to raise an issue with inputs, and even if they do not like the conclusion, that that might be an advance, or at least it would put us in the position of saying we are not foreclosing important areas of discussion, that we will be willing to negotiate on something beyond just the electoral process itself.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I suppose if you take something like the judicial system, that has to do with the prospects for safety of a person who accepts an amnesty and comes into the electoral process. So, how is that going to work? That is, I think, a natural subject that people would tend to discuss.

There are other matters, it seems to me, anyway, that are questions that a legitimate government addresses itself to, like land reform as an example, and those who are the legitimate government properly deal with a subject like that, and they are dealing with that, and there is lots of information around about it, but I do not see any particular room for negotiating with guerrillas about a subject like land reform.

But I think you get into a discussion with people about how you provide for safety, access to media, a secure ballot box, observance of results, and so forth, and you have got to talk about a wide range of things. There is no doubt about it.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, why rule out something like land reform or economic development? In a sense, the Government in the United States and we Senators negotiate with our constituents all the time, and sometimes the meetings which are held in rooms just like this one look a lot like insurgents, a lot of shouting and a lot of disagreements, and a lot of objections, and we do not

necessarily do what they say, but we talk to them, and there is utility in having them express themselves, and we are the government, and we have the responsibility to make the votes and the decisions.

But we talk, and we do not say when you come into a room, we will not talk to you about certain subjects. Just think, it would be so much healthier if the El Salvadoran Government would say, well, we will talk to you. We may not agree with you or do anything, but we will talk to you. Then if it is negotiation, so be it. You are not shooting your way into our government. We are just willing to discuss matters with you.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, people will talk and probably may talk endlessly. I think there must be a purpose to the talk. The purpose is to so construct an environment that is conducive to deciding what the legitimate government is. There is a legitimate government there now, and there is going to be an elected head of that government, and so what is the right process? That is, the object.

So, if I am sitting with you in a hearing like this to discuss a particular subject, and nobody will discuss it, they all want to discuss something else, we are not going to get anywhere with what it is we are trying to establish, and we have the prospect of an election coming up, not too far away. So I think you have to give some credence to the discussion if it is going to be purposeful.

PROCEDURAL DELAYS IN JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, when you were reading over that list of procedural snarls in the case of the four nuns, that outdoes anything but the most hypertechnical defense lawyers do in the United States of America, which up to that case was far in the lead, and in the recent remand by the appellate court in El Salvador of that case, they have gone far afield.

I have reviewed the evidence to the extent that the State Department has it to make available, and there are ballistic tests, there are fingerprints, palm prints, and confessions, and I have seen a lot of murder cases, and there is plenty of evidence to go forward with a murder case, plenty of evidence to go forward with a theft case, and the procedural safeguards allegedly that the Salvadoran Government is imposing are really absurdities. It would make the Warren court look like a lynch mob in terms of where they are heading.

There is just no rationality behind it. The Justice Department issued a statement on the decision and said, we do not ask the Government of El Salvador to violate its judicial process. We do expect justice. But there may come a point where you do condition aid on a timely trial. Certainly, in this country, as we prosecuting attorneys can tell you, if you do not try a case within the 90 days under the Speedy Trial Act or State procedure, the case is turned out of court, and that there are penalties imposed for not bringing a case to trial.

Secretary SHULTZ. You cannot defend what has happened under the judicial system of El Salvador. I will not do it. I do not do it. I do not think it is defensible. I think, in the case of the nuns, in that case, as I describe it to you, those charged, the charges have

not been removed, and they are still apprehended, but I do not—and I might say it is hard for me to defend lawyers, although as they say, some of my best friends are lawyers.

Look at the things we do in this country. My God. The *IBM* case dragged on and on and on. I do not know how many millions of dollars were spent before they dismissed it. It was a lawyers' paradise. It was a disgrace.

Senator SPECTER. It was also improperly dismissed. It was dismissed on the same afternoon that the *AT&T* case was dismissed, coincidentally, on a Friday afternoon. The case was dismissed over the objection of the judge. The lawyers' fault there may have been with the Justice Department.

Secretary SHULTZ. The lawyers were just playing games with each other.

Senator SPECTER. So do, perhaps, Secretaries and Senators.

Secretary SHULTZ. Could be.

Senator SPECTER. But back to the subject, I was not asking you to defend the El Salvadoran justice system. I understand you will not, and I am pleased that you do not. I was asking you the question as a remedy. What is wrong with saying, if you do not bring a case to trial within *X* days, or if you do not bring the case of the nuns to trial by June 1, we are going to cut off aid?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think it imposes a deadline in an unwarranted way on something like that. Of course, we are very concerned about that case, and naturally so, because Americans were involved, but I think there is something in a way not too good about being so mainly concerned about the cases that involve our citizens and seemingly therefore not to be worried about the many more Salvadorans involved. I would like to work with the situation.

As I said to you, I have told them, and I believe it is true, in spite of my sharing completely Senator Rudman's view that in the end, if they do not clean up this act, the support is going to dry up. They have been told that. They know that, and it will happen.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, is the United States, the CIA, or otherwise giving any aid to the exiles fighting in Nicaragua?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, this is a subject, to the extent it is discussed, as I understand it, it is discussed with the Intelligence Committees, and I do not want to comment on it.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, my time is up. I would just like to say in conclusion that my instinct is to support the administration here because really of the quality of your testimony and the candor that you come forward with, and I think there is a significant positioning that you have made where you make the statement that the American people may not be willing to support aid for El Salvador indefinitely, and I think you have seen the process, and it is a useful thing.

It seems curious to me in a sense that this confrontation exists over \$110 million in reprogramming, whether it is going to go to El Salvador or whether, as I understand it, it is going to go to Morocco, which is where it is coming from, and I do agree with you that we are involved with one interwoven process, and my own sense is that there are a great many more troublesome issues on arms reduction, or the issue of Ambassador Adelman, or the defense budget, where these similar lines of confrontation are drawn.

But you have taken over a very difficult job, and I think you have made progress and improvements, and I very much applaud your January 21 report where you made the certification, because you all but said that there was no progress being made. It was very tentative, but you came to a different judgment on the facts, and we discussed this when you were here 2 weeks ago, and I think that kind of candor is for me one confidence in what you are doing.

But Senator DeConcini said there comes a time when all of us will fall off the wagon. Senator Inouye did this month, and it will be a few more months for some of the rest of us. Senator Rudman and I are just debating how long it will be for him.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

MOROCCO

Secretary SHULTZ. May I make one more comment, Mr. Chairman? In the case of Morocco, we consider that those funds are needed and necessary and important, that in this immediate situation if we reprogram we will be asking you in the supplemental, so to speak, to replace those funds. So I do not want any inference that our concern and support for Morocco has changed.

Senator KASTEN. I would next like to call on Senator Stennis. I would like to say to the Senator from Mississippi that we are very pleased to have you join us today. I also want to say to you that as the ranking member of the full committee I was not sure where in the process you ought to speak. It is not my habit to have the distinguished Senator from Mississippi to speak or participate in a hearing last. But I was told this is correct that as you are an ex officio member—you know, Senator Hatfield is a member of this subcommittee.

But we are very, very pleased to have the Senator from Mississippi with us, and I would like now to call on the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, you have done an excellent job. You put me right in the place where I belong, right at the tail end.

Senator KASTEN. Well, that is not true.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you highly, and we barely know each other personally. We have not had a chance to know each other well. I commend you very highly for your testimony here. It is frank, open, clear, right to the point, and very illuminating.

This is the reason I am emphasizing that. I look around here, and I see I am the only survivor of the beginning of the war in Vietnam. I think that people are associating this problem to a great extent, a great extent, with that problem as it turned out to be. Even though there are some similarities, the differences are tremendous, and you have made that very clear, I think, coming from this open testimony here. Your very positive way is going to go a long, long way to clearing this up on the facts; not the problem altogether, of course.

REVIEW OF MONEY AMOUNTS

Now, what about the money? You got only \$23 million last year when you asked for \$60 million and had been getting \$60 million? Is that right, \$60 million? I dwell on that very briefly.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, this year we are operating under the continuing resolution which allowed \$25 million.

Senator STENNIS. What are you asking for now?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are asking for a reprogramming so that we have another \$60 million available in fiscal 1983.

Senator STENNIS. For the total 12 months?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that is added to what is in the second continuing resolution.

BASIC THOUGHTS

Senator STENNIS. Well, I do not know how to add that up, but I made up my mind here this morning that up to what you have been getting, \$60 million, that I would support that amount. I had been quite doubtful about whether I would.

You have made very clear here, I think, the real problem. You cannot cure all the details. \$60 million is not going to be a cure. It is just interim. But it has got to be contended with, it has got to be carried on. I understand the arms are being smuggled in there even by France. That is according to press reports. But anyway, they are getting in there from some source.

That will go further than anything else, almost, in stopping it or being the start of stopping it, a beginning. We are going to have these cases, people are going to get killed and we regret it.

I believe that if you could put an embargo or a blockade, a blockade at least of some kind there to start off and stop that arms flow, I believe that would be the best step that you could take.

I want to emphasize the great difference between this situation and Vietnam. For 10 years I heard the testimony about the war in Vietnam, and there is such a tremendous difference here in this case in location, the people, the proximity to us, and the supplies that I have just mentioned, and the long-range plan that you have mentioned with reference to other countries of communistic type and trend using, wherever they can, Salvador or wherever they can, to plant their seed, develop their ideas. That is the problem of the future, and we have got to live with it.

Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I came here with the information that you were going to testify in open session and you were really going to tell the facts, and that is what you have done. I have been highly rewarded.

Thank you again, very much.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASTEN. Thank you, Senator Stennis.

What we will now do is switch to a 3-minute time period. Hopefully we can get through at least one round, possibly more, to work within the requirements of the Secretary's time.

Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Secretary, in a curious twist of history, the deadline for the committee's consideration for your reprogramming request is Thursday, March 24th, the third anniversary of the as-

sassination of El Salvador's most eloquent spokesman for peace, Archbishop Romero.

El Salvador is a small country, as pointed out by my colleague from New Hampshire, and I doubt if more than 70 percent, or for that matter, 30 percent of Americans know where it is. Yet, I am certain you will agree with me, the prestige and the majesty of the Government of the United States are at stake.

Whether true or not, the widely accepted perception, especially in the capitals of the world, is that El Salvador is an American client, if not a puppet. It is perceived that the United States is the patron and that the United States is the supporter. In fact, none of our allies is providing any support for our policy.

Moreover, I believe the evidence indicates that some of our democratic allies are providing assistance to the other side. We condemn corruption, as you have pronounced your condemnation here. We have condemned political repression. We have condemned political assassinations. We have condemned political violence, and we have condemned denial of human rights.

But the evidence suggests to us that these abominations still persist. Because they continue to persist, this violence, this repression, this denial of human rights, I believe that many people perceive the United States as at the least tolerating, if not approving, these activities.

Mr. Secretary, instead of acting as El Salvador's major apologist, why do we not lower the boom? We have already put in over \$1 billion into El Salvador, and, as a former President used to say, there is a light on the other side of the tunnel. In this case I do not even see the light.

We speak of Cuba, Mr. Secretary, and I am convinced that history should have taught us that we played a part, maybe not a major part but a part, in the creation and the establishment of Fidel Castro. We were well aware of the utter corruption of Fulgencio Batista. We knew of his repression, we knew of his violence. But because he said he was against communism we supported him throughout.

The same thing happened with Anastasio Somoza's Nicaragua. I am afraid that by persisting in carrying out this policy we may be creating another Castro there. I think we are inviting revolutions. I think the time has come for us to support those who are being repressed, those who are victims of violence, those who are being slaughtered.

I think we are on the wrong path in El Salvador. The least we should do is to refuse to become apologists for these people and not only condemn them but to say to them: "If you want American dollars, as some of my colleagues here have suggested, this is what you are going to have to do."

That is all I have to say, sir.

Senator KASTEN. Mr. Secretary, would you like to reply?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir, I would.

Senator, I do not consider myself an apologist for anybody, not El Salvador, not the United States, not anybody. I try as best I can to state the facts as I see them, whether I am describing problems that my own country has or problems somebody else has.

I fully recognize the power of your comments and the difficulties we all have with some of the behavior that is documented. We can argue about numbers and so forth, but that argument is not to the point. The point is that there are a great many things that we would classify as atrocities.

Now, at the same time I have a quite different judgment than you express. I think we are trying to support as best we can those who seek better human rights, those who seek a better economic performance, those who seek a democratic process. If we pull the rug out from under those people by ceasing our support, all we do is tend to support those whose track record around the world is just awful. I do not mean just in terms or particularly in terms of economic achievements, but the way in which people are treated in the countries represented in the Soviet sphere is not tolerable by us.

So I do not want to see countries anywhere, let alone countries in our neighborhood, turned over to that influence. So I share your concern about the practices you describe. I see on the scales other practices that I regard as more positive, and looking at it on balance, it is my judgment that we simply must, in our interest and in the interest of the human values we support, continue to continue our aid.

In doing that I do not put myself in the position of an apologist, trying to give lame excuses for some of these abuses. I do not believe I have done that, or tried to describe the situation other than it is, as I see it.

Senator KASTEN. I will not ask 3 minutes of questions, but will call on Senator D'Amato at this time. Senator D'Amato?

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, first of all let me indicate for the record that I find your testimony to be candid and forthright, and I am certainly convinced of your deep sincerity in dealing with this problem, a very complex problem, a commitment that you sincerely believe, that we have no other alternative than to continue our aid and to encourage a democratic process or a building of a democratic process in El Salvador.

I agree with Senator DeConcini that we have to build up public confidence, that that is important, that some of the information, for example, in terms of the kind of aid and assistance and the flow of weapons and where it comes from, that may be classified, that we should find a way in which to make this information available to the American public, so that our position, your position, you see, is one they can accept—it will gain more acceptance by the American public.

I also believe that we have certain alternatives, without saying that we are simply going to let the Communists or the rebels be successful, as we attempt to aid, I think, the government there. That is to indicate to them that we will not tolerate the present government, we will not tolerate the kinds of things that have taken place, and that they will face the loss of support traditionally that has come from this committee and other areas of the Congress unless they heed us.

We are paying, the American taxpayers, the freight, so to speak. So we have a right to condition our aid on very legitimate objec-

tives. the prosecution of those who would murder and who would plunder. They have to understand that those are going to be more than just words and lip service, and that there will come a time that if this kind of thing continues that the Congress, I believe, will not be willing to continue to give the kind of support that we have in the past.

So this is a very difficult task, understandably, to balance, because once again I do not recognize what the rebels stand for, the guerrillas, as the alternative that we should accept, but in fact, if we are about to see the light at the end of the tunnel, as Senator Inouye has said, where is that light?

I say, do you believe that by the reprograming of this money and the training of additional troops, that that will give us the light that, at least militarily out on the field, that we will be able to stop the guerrillas from the kind of harassment that wrought economic havoc to the region? Do you think that will be the case 3 months from now or 6 months from now?

Secretary SHULTZ. I believe this will help. We also have some money in the supplemental, \$50 million, and beyond that, as many members of the committee have brought out, we attach a tremendous amount of importance to the economic dimensions, the political dimensions of this. There is a military-shield dimension, but if we are going to be successful we have to be successful in the other spheres as well. Otherwise, we will not satisfy our own sense, not only of a relative standard of progress, but of an absolute standard of condition that we find agreeable.

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Johnston?

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONDITIONS ON AID TO EL SALVADOR

Mr. Secretary, it is my tentative intention to vote for, and indeed to propose if no one else has a better formulation, that we make further aid dependent upon success of the Salvadorans in prosecuting, first of all, the case of the four nuns. Second, I would like to get some other formulations that progress on human rights be more specific, considerably more specific than I have seen.

My question to you is, if the Congress did put those kind of conditions on aid to El Salvador, can you give me a suggestion of how much time you think would be proper to allow the Salvadorans to bring those cases to trial?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, having blown off steam about lawyers, I recognize your superior wisdom on things of this kind and just what these procedural matters amount to, if anything, I am not too sure. I see by my fact sheet that the attorney general of El Salvador has said that the case should be brought to trial between 6 weeks and 3 months from now. So that is one attorney's opinion.

I suspect it is less a matter of procedure and more a matter of willpower, but that is a nonlawyer's view of it.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think that is a very, very good answer, and that is exactly the way I see it. It is a question of willpower, and if we make this condition I think that it will be done.

Now, if you have to certify, if we made some kind of fail-safe on that condition that said, unless the Secretary of State certifies that adequate progress is being made, you could not so certify at this time, could you?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am sorry. Could you say the beginning of that?

Senator JOHNSTON. If we made some kind of fail-safe condition that said, all aid shall be suspended after a certain date unless the Secretary certifies that with all deliberate speed and all due enthusiasm the Government of El Salvador is prosecuting the case, you could not make that kind of certification at this time, could you, or would you?

What I am contemplating in my mind is whether we should put a fail-safe on there, and frankly, could we properly trust you to include such a fail-safe—or to interpret such a fail-safe?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think I would have to look at it carefully and satisfy myself about these various explanations which Senator Specter as a prosecuting attorney and you have great skepticism, and I guess Senator Leahy has skepticism as well. I do not pretend to be able to pass a judgment on that at this point.

I will tell you this—

Senator JOHNSTON. I will tell you, as a layman I share that skepticism.

Secretary SHULTZ. I will tell you, as a Government official both now and in my previous tour here, I am a deep believer that it is my job to administer the laws as the Congress has given them to me, even if I do not like them. If I do not like them, I come to you and argue that you should change them.

I am reluctant to see you lay down a condition which says that if you do not do something with the judiciary by this point in time, then the rug is going to be pulled out, for a variety of reasons. One, I do not have a very good sense of what is the proper time.

But more fundamentally, what we are trying to do is help the Salvadorans build a judicial system, and the case is important as such; over the long run it is the system and the willpower and the validity to it that is the answer to the sort of question that Senator Inouye had put up to us. So I think it is the system that we need to concentrate on, and it is sort of denigrating in a way to throw that sort of condition on there.

But at any rate, naturally, to the extent that we can provide insights we will. We have, I think, supplied the chairman with some thoughts on how judicial reform ought to move, and also in some of the other areas.

Senator JOHNSTON. I agree with you. Just to say, Mr. Secretary, that this particular example is so egregious that almost nothing else can proceed, in my view, until this problem is solved, because it is the symbol, the guiding light for all the Salvadorans, who see this lack of justice, lack of trial, as being the symbol that they could count on the government not to prosecute them if they do the same thing.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it is a bad show. I think the fact that Lieutenant Lopez Subrian is not in jail is similar, and so you can think of various examples, unfortunately.

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you.

Senator KASTEN. I would like to remind the members and also the Secretary that we are running up against a time limit. So we will try to be short with our questions. Hopefully, you can be short with your answers.

Senator Rudman.

Senator RUDMAN. Mr. Secretary, let me say, if you had the benefit of a legal education you might have answered my friend from Florida with the old adage that tough cases make bad law. I do not agree with that suggestion at all, and I would oppose it, not because I do not think the case is not a landmark case, not because I do not think it stands for everything that the Senator from Florida says that it stands for, but——

Senator JOHNSTON. Louisiana.

Senator RUDMAN [continuing]. When this Congress—oh, Louisiana, excuse me.

But when this Congress starts to micromanage foreign policy with that kind of footnote, no matter how laudatory it is, then it seems to me that we are starting to do your job. Quite frankly, I do not think we ought to.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your comment.

LAND REFORM STIPULATIONS

Senator RUDMAN. Let me ask you one question. The Congress has established in the Helms amendment, I believe, conditions on our aid in terms of how it cannot be used for land reform acquisition. Would you be better off in terms of what you are trying to do, in terms of what we are all talking about today, if those restrictions did not apply?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, Mr. McPherson has testified to some of the difficulties there. Sometimes I think it is well not to have authority to do certain kinds of things, but I do not want to speak about that particular case.

Maybe you can comment on the land reform restriction, Peter, whether you think we would benefit from having it removed.

Mr. MCPHERSON. A year ago the administration had asked for some money in connection with compensation for land reform, and in effect it asked that the restriction be waived or changed. There is some problem with compensation at this time.

It is true, however, that the land reform program is going forward really quite well, in fact quite remarkably. In the last 5 months there has been a 71-percent increase in applications under the Land to the Tiller program. In addition, the current moneys that we are asking for on the economic side have been really very carefully calculated and spoken for. So in that sense, we do not really have room under the current package for compensation.

Senator RUDMAN. I just want to apologize to my friend from Louisiana. He and my friend from Florida are both so handsome and athletic looking that I sometimes confuse the two of them. [Laughter.]

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you.

Secretary SHULTZ. Senator, if I could interject a comment, not about the Senator from Louisiana. That is your problem.

Senator RUDMAN. It certainly is.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think there is quite a difference between the Congress saying, here is some money and we do not want you to use any of it for this purpose, on the one hand and saying, here is some money and unless somebody does X that we want them to do, we are going to take money away. Those are very different instructions.

Senator RUDMAN. A very important distinction.

Senator KASTEN. Senator Leahy?

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Secretary, you have discussed your general disdain of lawyers, at least in the context of what we are discussing today.

Secretary SHULTZ. I hope the lawyers of the world did not take me too seriously.

THE CASE OF THE MURDERED CHURCHWOMEN

Senator LEAHY. I am not here as a spokesman for any bar association. I had to put up with enough delaying tactics when I was a prosecutor.

But let us get this thing into context. When you compare this nuns' case, for example, with the *IBM* case, or compare the nuns' case with the *ITT* case, that is not really criticizing lawyers; that is detracting from your high office. I think it is demeaning to this committee, quite frankly.

It throws me back in my mind to some of the statements of your predecessor, who did not come in with some of the calm reasoning that you have in the Central American thing when he suggested that the nuns were perhaps killed running a road block, something difficult to do considering the fact that they were bound hand and feet.

If the facts are there, a murder case is the most easy case to prove. I have tried enough of them myself, as others here have. Either there is a murder or there was not a murder. You either have a suspect or you do not. If you do, you either have the facts to prove it or you do not.

In this case, the facts are there. I have seen the facts. I have gone over the review. I have seen what the FBI provided. It is an open and shut case. If it is not being prosecuted then El Salvador is thumbing their nose at us. They are saying, give us \$1 billion and go to hell. That is exactly what they are saying. They took a case as well publicized as this and say, we do not care what you say, we do not care about your certification, we do not care about the restrictions; just give us your money, we will do what we want.

I think quite frankly, Mr. Secretary, if we were to put some restrictions on there such as those suggested by the Senator from Louisiana or by anybody else, it would make no difference whatsoever. If we said your next certification had to be specifically on that, it would make no difference whatsoever. They still will not try it.

I will tell you one of the reasons they will not do it. They are just afraid that if they get those people in there, some of them are going to start squealing on each other, and then we are going to find more and more and more of the government officials who have

been involved in murder, rape, torture, extortion, and everything else, in the same way it might have been on the other side. But they are afraid to open a can of worms, and that is why tens of thousands of murders go unprosecuted in El Salvador.

I say, quite frankly, there is not a thing we can do about it. So we should make up our mind what the American policy is going to be. If we want to send money down there, then let us not even have any holds on it. Let that actually be our policy. We will do away with certification, because it is going to be a rubber-stamping review. We are going to do it anyway, this is going to be our policy.

If we want to say we want to stop arms from Cuba, then what is our policy on that? Shall we blockade it, shall we invade it?

It has been stated on the floor of the Senate by two members of the Senate in the past few days that arms have increased substantially in Cuba, that they have Soviet bombers down there in violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Is that a fact? If it is, should we be pointing at that?

Why do we not state exactly what we are going to get out of this? How are we going to guarantee anything down there? How are we going to guarantee change in the judicial system? How are we going to guarantee stopping arms shipments in there?

Not one word has been said of what we can do that will actually make them follow what we want them to do. Certainly putting conditions on the money has not done it in the past.

Do you know of anything we can do to stop the arms coming from Cuba?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I have tried to suggest some things in my testimony and comments this morning, and they go to a broad-ranging strategy. So I have done the best I can, Senator.

As far as my comments on lawyers are concerned, I will stand corrected. I will never criticize a lawyer again. [Laughter.]

Senator LEAHY. Oh, no, Mr. Secretary, I have been very critical of them, too. As a matter of fact, I am one of the few people here that has actually sent lawyers to prison. So I do not have any problem with criticizing the bar.

What I am saying is this. Let us not mix apples and oranges in this thing. We have an open and shut case down there. They are ignoring us, and what does that say of our policy, what does that say of our restriction? That is my concern.

CLOSING REMARKS

Senator KASTEN. Thank you, Senator.

As a former shoe manufacturer from Gainesville, Wis., I agree with your comments about attorneys.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony. My hope is, as it was several weeks ago, that we can still develop a consensus in our subcommittee based on our concerns and frankly on the agreements we share. I would like to think that we could get all members of this subcommittee participating in that consensus, and that still may be possible.

It is my intention to confer with members of the subcommittee and our staff throughout the afternoon and possibly into the evening. I want to let the subcommittee members know that possibly,

after we have gone through a process of conferring, we may try to gather after a vote, either this afternoon, tonight, or tomorrow morning in one of the rooms of The Capitol, and just see where we are.

I believe that anything we do is going to have to incorporate a number of the elements that have been talked about today, that we are going to have to address the questions of advisers and trainers, that we probably are going to have to in one way or another address the problems of the judicial system, and specifically the concerns of the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Louisiana.

I also think that we are going to want to address and somehow try to encourage free, fair, and safe democratic elections. I am hopeful that we can go forward, and that we can meet most of the requirements of the administration's request for reprogramming.


I thank you very much for your testimony.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE CHARTS

Before we recess the hearing, I will submit 3 charts by the committee on the economic and military assistance program.

[The charts follow:]

FY 1983 Economic and Military Assistance Requests for El Salvador*



Total: \$363.3 Million

*Includes: Continuing Resolution Funds (spent) plus \$60 million Reprogramming plus revised supplemental requests.
Note: Pie adds up to 101% due to rounding.

Economic and Military Assistance to El Salvador

	FY 1982 (Actual)	FY 1983 (CR Levels)	FY 1983 (Reprogramming)	FY 1983 (Supplemental)	FY 1983 (Total Proposed)
506 (a) Drawdown	55.0	—	—	—	—
Foreign Military Credit Sales	16.5	16.5	60.0	—	76.5
Military Assistance Program (Grant)	8.5	8.5	—	50.0	58.5
International Military Education and Training	2.0	1.3	—	—	1.3
Subtotal Military Assistance	\$ 82.0 (30.6%)	\$ 26.3 (14.9%)	\$ 60.0 (43.8%)	\$ 50.0 (100%)	\$ 136.3 (37.5%)
Economic Support Fund	115.0	95.0	45.0	—	140.0
Development Assistance	36.2	25.0	23.1	—	48.1
P.L. 480	34.9	30.0	9.0	—	39.0
Subtotal Economic Assistance	\$ 186.1 (69.4%)	\$ 150.0 (85.1%)	\$ 77.1 (56.2%)	—	\$ 227.1 (62.5%)
Total Economic and Military Assistance	\$ 268.1	\$ 176.3	\$ 137.1	\$ 50.0	\$ 363.4

Economic and Military Assistance to El Salvador FY 1978 — FY 1984

	FY 1976 (Actual)	FY 1978 (Actual)	FY 1980 (Actual)	FY 1981 (Actual)	FY 1982 (Actual)	FY 1983 (Estimated)	FY 1984 (Proposed)	FY 1978-1984 (Combined)
505 (a) Drawdown	—	—	—	25.0	55.0	—	—	80.0
Foreign Military Credit Sales	—	—	5.7	10.0	16.5	76.5	30.0	138.7
Military Assistance Program (Grant)	—	—	—	—	8.5	58.5	55.0	122.0
International Military Education and Training	—	—	0.2	0.5	2.0	1.3	1.3	5.3
Subtotal Military Assistance	—	—	\$ 5.9 (9.2%)	\$ 35.5 (23.7%)	\$ 82.0 (90.9%)	\$ 136.3 (97.8%)	\$ 86.3 (70.8%)	\$ 346.0 (70.8%)
Economic Support Fund	—	—	9.1	44.9	115.0	140.0	120.0	429.0
Development Assistance	8.0	6.9	43.2	33.4	36.2	48.1	38.0	213.8
Peace Corps	1.2	1.6	0.5	0.4	—	—	—	3.7
P.L. 480	1.7	2.9	5.5	35.3	34.9	39.0	37.5	156.8
Subtotal Economic Assistance	\$ 10.9 (100%)	\$ 11.4 (100%)	\$ 58.3 (90.5%)	\$ 114.0 (70.3%)	\$ 186.1 (90.4%)	\$ 227.1 (97.2%)	\$ 195.5 (82.5%)	\$ 804.5 (82.5%)
Total Economic and Military Assistance	\$ 10.9	\$ 11.4	\$ 64.2	\$ 149.5	\$ 268.1	\$ 363.4	\$ 281.8	\$ 1,149.3

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

The subcommittee will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.


[Whereupon, at 12 noon, Tuesday, March 22, the hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

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(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



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